FILOSOFIDAGARNA 2022

The Swedish Congress of Philosophy 2022
Lund

BOOK OF ABSTRACTS

Edited by Robert Pál-Wallin

LUND UNIVERSITY

ABOUT THE CONFERENCE

Filosofidagarna (The Swedish Congress of Philosophy) is a biennial philosophy conference that circulates between universities in Sweden. The 2022 conference is arranged by Lund University's Department of Philosophy between 10-12 June. The conference venue is the LUX building at Helgonavägen 3, which houses the Joint Faculties of Humanities and Theology. Around 100 researchers will present work from all areas of philosophy.

Organising Committee

Erik J. Olsson (Chairman), Lund University; Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen (Secretary), Lund University; Björn Petersson (Acting Secretary), Lund University; Robert Pál-Wallin, Lund University; Yuliya Kanygina, University of Gothenburg

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Agential Indeterminism

Christian List
Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München

ABSTRACT

There is much discussion on whether free will is compatible with determinism. Free-will compatibilists argue that it is, while incompatibilists argue that it isn't. There is less discussion, by contrast, on whether agency itself is compatible with determinism. Given how central the idea of agency is to our human self-understanding and to the social sciences, this question is hardly less important. Helen Steward has recently defended a striking view she calls "agency incompatibilism": "there could be no agents or actions at all in a deterministic world" (Steward 2012, p. 115). If Steward is right, then determinism poses an even greater threat to our conventional understanding of the place of humans in the world than typically recognized by incompatibilists about free will. My aim in this talk is to revisit Steward's position and to defend an argument for a subtly different form of agency incompatibilism, which I think will be harder to resist, especially from a naturalistic perspective. I argue that our current best understanding of intentional agency in the sciences of human behaviour presupposes a form of indeterminism, which I call "agential indeterminism". Without such indeterminism, there could not be any intentional agency as conventionally understood. I will explore the upshots of this conclusion, including its compatibility with physical determinism.

KEYNOTE

TBA
Hilary Greaves
Oxford University

INVITED SECTION LECTURE SPEAKERS

Nudging as a Science of Design

Erik Angner
Stockholm University

ABSTRACT
The so-called nudge agenda due to Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein has proven polarizing. To advocates, it allows us to improve people's choices and thereby their well-being at minimal cost and without interfering with their liberty or autonomy. To critics, the nudge agenda represents an ineffective and dangerous intrusion into the sphere of personal decision-making by bureaucrats who may be no better at making decisions than the people whose choices they are trying to improve. In my view, much of the confusion and controversy is due to the manner in which the original proposal was framed, in the context of "libertarian paternalism." This talk will propose a new frame that is less conducive to confusion and unnecessary controversy. The frame casts the nudge agenda as a science of design, as Herbert Simon thought of it. The science of design uses decision theory not so much to explain or predict behavior, but to build institutions that yield desirable outcomes. Such efforts are in fact common across modern economics. Thinking of nudging as a science of design suggests it's a lot less original than its authors think, but also a lot less controversial than its critics allege.

Instrumental Reasons Without Difference-Making

Gunnar Björnsson
Stockholm University

ABSTRACT

It is natural to think that when we have instrumental reasons for an action, this is because that action would promote the realization of some relevant end. (Set aside complications involving uncertainty and multiple ends.) Moreover, consideration of a range of cases seems to indicate that reasons are fundamentally contrastive: a reason for action is always a reason for something rather than some (contextually determined) set of alternatives to it (Snedegar 2017). This suggests that we have instrumental reasons for an action just in case it would realize the end to a greater extent than its alternatives. But other cases suggest that we can have instrumental reasons to perform actions that do not increase the realization of the relevant end relative to salient alternatives. In this talk, I motivate an account of instrumental reasons that leaves room for both cases seemingly calling for contrastivism and cases without difference-making. An upshot is that the end of a collective action might give us instrumental reasons to contribute to that collective action whether or not we will make a difference to that end; another upshot that the strength of non-contrastive reasons will be comparatively elusive.

Livsmening och Gudstro

Carl-Reinhold Bråkenhielm
Uppsala University

ABSTRACT

Filosofisk analys av frågan om livets mening har vitaliserats under de senaste decennierna. Susan Wolf och Thaddeus Metz har publicerat flera monografier i ämnet. Wolf har utvecklat distinktionen mellan meningen i livet och meningen med livet och framhållit meningsfrågornas relativa oberoende av frågor opm moral och lycka (*Meaning in Life and Why it Matters*, 2010) och Metz har uppmärksammat förhållandet mellan livsmening och religiös tro (*Meaning in Life. An Analytic Study*, 2013 och *God, Soul, and the Meaning of Life,* 2019). Syftet med mitt föredrag är att med utgångspunkt från Metz ge en kortfattad överblick över gudstros positiva och negativa relevans för frågan om livets mening. Fyra principståndpunkter kan urskiljas: (1) *Stark gudstro* innebär att *endast* gudstron kan ge livet en mening. Motsatsen är (2) *stark naturalism* som innebär att livets mening *endast* kan finnas och förverkligas i en rent fysisk värld utan Gud. (3) Modest naturalism innebär att den starka gudstron är ohållbar och att livets mening kan finnas och förverkligas i en rent fysisk värld. Slutligen kan man tänka sig (4) en *modest gudstro*, som bejakar att det finns en rent inomvärldslig mening *i* livet utan någon gudstro, men till skillnad från (2) tillägger en gudstro kan fördjupa denna inomvärldsliga livsmening. Jag ska gå igenom några huvudargument för och emot dessa olika principståndpunkter.

Structural Injustice as Distributive

Johan Brännmark
Malmö University

ABSTRACT
Questions of justice have often been seen as primarily distributive, e.g., by John Rawls: "For us the primary subject of justice is the basic structure of society, or more exactly, the way in which the major social institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of advantages from social cooperation." One important criticism of this approach is that leads to significant structural injustices being overlooked. Iris Marion Young was an early key theorist here, criticizing what she calls "the distributive paradigm" for being too limited and for neglecting backgrounding features of our societies. According to Young, in order to properly understand structural injustices, we need to rethink the underlying ontological presuppositions standardly assumed by liberal political theorists. More recently, similar arguments have been by theorists like C.W. Mills and Sally Haslanger, who both worry about ontological individualism not just in terms of it underlying liberal political theory, but also serving as an ideology in contemporary Western societies.

In this talk, however, it is argued that the main problem with the traditional approach is not really its underlying individualism but instead its underlying statism: that it tends to limit what is seen as matters of justice to what can relatively directly be addressed through government policies. It is then also proposed that structural injustices can typically be understood in terms of three kinds of distributions across individuals, namely of rights, resources, and risks. But as long as we think about concerns of justice in a way that is limited by the capacities and responsibilities of the state, we will be unable to articulate rich

enough conceptions of all the rights, resources, and risks that are relevant for people having fair sets of opportunities for leading good and meaningful lives.

Value Magnitudes Revisited

Krister Bykvist
Stockholm University

ABSTRACT
Recently, there has been a revival in taking empirical magnitudes seriously. Weights, heights, velocities and the like have been accepted as abstract entities in their own right rather than just equivalence classes of objects. This magnitude realism has many virtues: it explains the equivalence between 'x is taller than y' and 'the height of x is greater than the height of y'; it gives a straightforward explanation of cross-world and cross-time comparisons of empirical magnitudes, (e.g., 'I could have been heavier than I am'); and it makes it easier to satisfy the axioms for measurement of empirical magnitudes, since one is not bound to quantify over a finite domain of physical objects.

In Bykvist (2021), I show that something similar holds for value magnitudes. If we posit value magnitudes, we can easily explain the equivalence between 'x is better than y' and 'the value of x is greater than the value of y', and also explain cross-world and cross-time comparisons of value, (e.g., 'I could have been better than I am'). We will also have an easier time satisfying the axioms for extensive measurement of value, since we are not bound to quantify over a finite domain of value bearers. Furthermore, realism about value magnitudes has some further virtues that have no analogues in empirical magnitudes. For example, it enables us to provide (a) a definition of good, bad, and neutral in terms of (extensive) value magnitudes that avoids the pitfalls in existing definitions, (b) a natural, non-

mathematical, understanding of value aggregation, and (c) a plausible interpretation of Moorean organic unities.

Of course, realism about value magnitudes does not come for free. One has to accept a rich ontology of abstract value magnitudes. The question is whether, to echo David Lewis, the price is right. Are the benefits in theoretical unity and economy well worth the entities? In my talk will present some of the benefits and costs, focusing on aspects that I ignored or skated over in my paper, and suggest that the price is affordable, at least for traditional moral realists.

The Prison Riot Paradox

Christian Dahlman
Lund University

ABSTRACT
100 prison inmates participate in a riot and escape from the prison. During the riot, 99 of them assault and kill a guard on duty. One prisoner is caught and is prosecuted for participating in the killing of the guard. The evidence clearly shows that he participated in the riot, but there is no evidence that shows whether he was one of the 99 prisoners who participated in the killing. At the trial, he claims that he was the only participant in the riot who did not participate in the killing of the guard. The prosecutor points out that there is a 99% probability that the defendant is guilty and argues that this must be sufficient for the standard of proof, but the judge decides that the 'naked statistical evidence' does not justify a conviction and acquits the defendant. Most lawyers agree with the judge but disagree on why this kind of evidence is insufficient, and the case has been discussed for decades in the philosophy of legal evidence as a 'proof paradox'. In my talk, I will discuss various proposals for how to solve the 'prison riot paradox'.

Final but Incomplete

Richard Dawid
Stockholm University

ABSTRACT

String theory has not come close to a complete formulation after half a century of intense research. On the other hand, a number of features of the theory suggest that the theory, once completed, may be a final theory. It is argued in this talk that those two conspicuous characteristics of string physics are related to each other. The property that links them together is the fact that string theory has no free parameters at a fundamental level. The paper looks at possible implications of this situation for the long term prospects of theory building in fundamental physics.

Motivated Reasoning and Rationality

Kathrin Glüer-Pagin
Stockholm University

ABSTRACT

In many Western societies, fact polarization -- "intense, persistent partisan contestation over facts that admit of scientific evidence" (Kahan 2016) -- appears to be increasing. On a picture fairly standard in the empirical literature, the changing media and information environment is only part of the explanation. Human irrationality is another. This standard picture has recently been challenged in various ways, however, mostly by philosophers. Some ask whether the observed polarization could in fact be rational. In his very recent book *Bad Belief* (2022), Neil Levy goes further and argues that it indeed does result from "rational processes".

I'll focus on one influential irrationality account: Based on a whole series of experimental studies, Dan Kahan argues that a main source of fact polarization (in the US) is politically motivated reasoning. My question in this talk will be whether Kahan's experimental data can be understood as resulting from Levy-style rational processes.

Categories are Determined by Their Invariances

Peter Gärdenfors
Lund University

ABSTRACT
The world as we perceive it is structured into objects, actions and places that form parts of events. In this talk, my aim is to explain why these categories are so fundamental for our thinking. From an empiricist and evolutionary standpoint, I argue that the reduction of the complexity of sensory signals is based on the brain's capacity to identify various types of invariances that are relevant for the activities of an organism. My first aim is to explain why places, objects and actions are primary categories in our constructions of the external world. I show that the invariances that determine these categories have their separate characteristics and that they are, by and large, independent of each other. This separation is supported by what is known about neural mechanisms. My second aim is to show that the category of events can be analyzed as being constituted of the primary categories.

Deductive Reasoning Without Rule Following

Anandi Hattiangadi *(with Corine Besson)*
Stockholm University

ABSTRACT
According to a widely held view, deductive reasoning necessarily involves rule-following. Indeed, this is a central platform of the inferentialist tradition according to which the meanings of logical terms are determined by their introduction and elimination rules. In this paper, we present an objection to this view that is inspired by the 'adoption problem' that Kripke puts forward in his forthcoming paper, 'The Question of Logic'. Though Kripke's official target in this paper is the anti-exceptionalism about logic associated with Putnam and Quine, we argue that it has a broader significance, and that one of the lessons that can be drawn from this problem is that it must be possible to reason deductively without rule following. Finally, we sketch a picture of how to reason without following rules and draw out the implications for inferentialism.

Konst, Konstvärlden och Konstvärden

Göran Hermerén
Lund University

ABSTRACT
Ett viktigt syfte med mitt föredrag är att kontrastera den mer sociologiska approach som den institutionella teorin i olika versioner representerar mot en värdeorienterad teori om konst genom att lyfta fram värderingarna i de skäl som används i diskussioner om vad som är konst och bra konst.
Det finns vidare flera konstbegrepp, konstvärldar och konstpubliker. Den här presenterade teorin är alltså pluralistisk i

den meningen att den inte räknar med att det finns bara ett konstbegrepp, en konstvärld, en konstpublik och ett konstvärde – utan många.

Vad som är konst och bra konst baseras på värderingar. Kontroverser i dessa frågor löses inte av sociologiska studier av konstvärldens aktörer. Det intressanta är inte dessa aktörers handlingar utan skälen för deras handlingar. Värden och värderingar spelar en viktig roll i detta sammanhang.

Konstvärlden är inte höjd över kritik – detsamma gäller för övrigt också vetenskapen. Att konstvärlden förr eller senare får rätt betyder inte att konstvärden alltid har rätt.

Revisiting Regan and the Duty to Co-operate

Karsten Klint Jensen
University of Copenhagen

ABSTRACT
Donald Regan's Utilitarianism and Cooperation (1980) pointed at a problem for utilitarianism (which, according to him, is shared by all 'traditional' theories) and developed a solution to the problem. The problem is that utilitarianism, in certain cases, is indeterminate, which means that it can be satisfied by different patterns of behavior of different overall value. Hence, universal satisfaction of the theory need not imply that the group produces the best possible outcome. Regan's solution consists in a decision procedure, according to which co-operation among those who are willing to co-operate enables production of the best possible outcome by this group.

   After having published the book, Regan oddly disappeared from the philosophical scene, and the book has not had much impact maybe because the seemingly thorough analysis in many ways appears incomplete. For one thing, Regan's diagnosis is that traditional theories are 'exclusive act-oriented', but this is

not very helpful since he does not define this property precisely. Neither does he explain what causes indeterminateness, nor when it leads to possible satisfaction of patterns of behavior of different value. He merely presents a certain kind of stylized example. Moreover, his decision procedure is only applicable in situations with few agents who are able to mutually recognize each other's preferences. Hence, it is not clear that Regan's justification of the decision procedure works. All in all, the decision procedure appears somewhat ad hoc.

My aim is to revisit Regan's arguments. The few who have commented on Regan haven taken a route which is merely implicit for Regan, namely that in order to resolve the decision situation in the imagined example, we need to understand the agents' preferences. This seems to suggest that there is an underlying issue here, namely how utilitarianism (and other ethical theories) should address games (i.e. choice situations where the outcome of a choice is dependent of what others do). On the face of it, ethical theory and game theory does not match very well, because the former assumes 'ethical' preferences, whereas the latter assumes 'self-interested' preferences. This may be why the literature is sparse on the matter. However, the problem in Regan's examples seems to arise from the possibility of both types of preferences being present, and the analyses attempt to clarify what exactly are the preferences of the agents in the situation.

In this light, Regan's 'decision procedure' can be seen to consist in two parts: (1) adding information about the agents' preferences to the choice situation; and (2) a strategy to solve the 'pure' co-ordination problem which (1) makes visible. Hence, the purpose of (1) is to identify the game situation for those who are ethically motivated, leaving others out of the picture. This analysis makes it clear that, for Regan, the original problem is one of a game for which game theory has no solution. It also makes clear, that (1) is a matter of adding another act to the

choice situation, the outcome of which is to transform the choice situation.

Illuminated by the above analysis, I shall revisit Regan's central claims. In doing that, I shall explore the following questions: (a) What is the expected value of the act of adding information to the choice situation? (b) What is the expected value of the act of changing the choice situation, e.g. by introducing incentives for self-interested agents? Note that this way of including those with self-interested preferences can be applied before or after information about preferences have been obtained. (c) When none of these acts is (fully) available, what can then be done?

Potentialism in the Philosophy and Foundations of Mathematics

Øystein Linnebo
University of Oslo

ABSTRACT
Aristotle famously claimed that the only coherent form of infinity is potential, not actual. However many objects there are, it is possible for there to be yet more; but it is impossible for there in fact to be infinitely many objects. Although this view was superseded by Cantor's transfinite set theory, even Cantor regarded the collection of all sets as "unfinished" or incapable of "being together". In recent years, there has been a revival of interest in potentialist approaches to the philosophy and foundations of mathematics. The lecture provides a survey of such approaches, covering both technical results and associated philosophical views, as these emerge both in published work and in work in progress.

The Anatomy of Metaphysical Explanation

Anna-Sofia Maurin
University of Gothenburg

ABSTRACT
In this presentation I argue, first, that an account of the nature of metaphysical explanation should start with metaphysical explanation and not with grounding. I argue, second, that once grounding and metaphysical explanation have been properly disentangled, both what I call worldly unionism and what I call representational unionism come across as really rather unattractive and that, therefore, explanation is most likely best understood along separatist lines. In the literature, almost all focus has been on what I call worldly separatism. Once grounding and metaphysical explanation have been properly disentangled, however, we can see more clearly that there exists yet another kind of separatism that deserves our attention: representational separatism. Representational separatism is the view that metaphysical explanations are representational states tracking (other) representational/non-worldly relational states. Just like representational unionism, representational separatism is hence anti-realist about explanation. Anti-realism about explanation is an increasingly popular view these days. According to some, a point in anti-realism's favor is that it's cheap. I argue, finally, that if the best version of anti-realism about metaphysical explanation is representational separatist, we 'owe' an account of the representational structures such explanations track. *Pace* those who think anti-realism is cheap this is a cost that whoever defends the account must be able to pay. Whether it is a cost equal to that holding a realist view on the nature of metaphysical explanation incurs is a question I will leave for another occasion.

The Role of Pragmatics in Practical Ethics

Christian Munthe
University of Gothenburg

ABSTRACT

This talk explores three related avenues: First, a development of orthodox applied ethics research, such as it transpired during the 1970's and 80's and thereafter consolidated itself, into more and more of what I call practical ethics, where aims are expanded from not only explaining what is right and good (ceteris paribus) in specific contexts, but also to help changing the world for the better in these contexts. One example of this is the increased attention to so-called non-ideal theory in (applied) political philosophy. Second, an increased role for pragmatic considerations in the evaluation of normative conclusions related to specific practical issues seemingly following from this development. Third, four specific challenges to practical ethics implied by this expanded role for pragmatic considerations. All of the challenges question whether pragmatic considerations of practical feasibility can be rationally squared with the normative ambitions of practical ethics. I argue that two of these challenges are based on misunderstandings, while two are quite real. However, I also argue that these real new challenges should be possible to handle by developing the methodology of practical ethics, albeit that development remains to be undertaken.

Ruling Conversations: Plato's Protagoras on Joint Inquiries

Pauliina Remes
Uppsala University

ABSTRACT
Plato seems to think that the best method of inquiry is often a joint or shared conversation. The paper argues that in the *Protagoras*, we see him argue explicitly for the understanding of *dialegesthai* (to converse) and *sunousia* ('being with', or 'conversation') as shared activities of a goal directed kind. Moreover, Plato seems to suggest that the successful striving towards the shared goal (that of increase in understanding) necessitates that the persons involved ought to commit themselves to the goal, and that this commitment ought to govern the way that they contribute to the activity. This leads to many normative suggestions that the participants in conversation - often but not exclusively Socrates - express in Platonic inquiries. Are there definitory rules for inquiries? Or are the suggestions better understood as strategic rules? The paper discusses the general framework of my larger ongoing study on Platonic joint inquiries, introducing preliminarily some of their normative features.

On Nativism and Empiricism about Colour Cognition

Pär Sundström
Umeå University

ABSTRACT
Hume maintained that:

> A blind man can form no notion of colours; a deaf man of sounds. Restore either of them that sense in which he is deficient; by opening this new inlet for his sensations, you also open an inlet for the ideas; and he finds no difficulty in conceiving these objects. The case is the same, if the object, proper for exciting any sensation, has never been applied to the organ (Enquiry, section 2).

Hume takes this to support the view that all the materials of thinking are derived from "sentiment". John Campbell makes similar claims:

> Someone who is blind or entirely colour-blind from birth, or someone who is normally sighted but simply never encounters colours, cannot understand colour predicates as we ordinarily understand them. Experience of the colours does some work in our ordinary grasp of colour concepts ("Manipulating colour: Pounding an almost" 2006, 31-2).

I shall assess (some of) what we know about these matters. I shall specify a weak and a strong *empiricist* hypothesis and a weak and a strong *nativist* hypothesis. The weak hypotheses concern what dispositions we have to acquire certain abilities to think about colours. The strong hypotheses concern how we typically acquire these abilities. I will argue the following: We can be highly confident that that at least one of the weak hypotheses is true

and that exactly one of the strong hypotheses is true. And we can be confident about certain conditionals, e.g., that if the strong empiricist hypothesis is true then the weak empiricist hypothesis is true. But other than that we know very little about which hypotheses are true. The types of cases of sensory deprivation that Hume and Campbell mention tell us little if anything about that, for example. For all we know (and somewhat surprisingly I think) we may have some interesting "innate" abilities to think about colours.

Knowledge Resistance and the Politization of Facts

Åsa Wikforss
Stockholm University

ABSTRACT
Knowledge resistance involves a form of resistance to available evidence, where factual beliefs are driven by desires rather than by the evidence. An important factor fueling the resistance is the politization of policy relevant factual claims. In the light of this, it is essential to keep distinct the factual basis for political decisions and the values or political goals underlying those decisions. This, also, is something the relevant experts need be aware of when engaging in public debates. In a democracy experts provide the factual input for decision making but they do not determine the political goals.

WORKSHOPS AT FILOSOFIDAGARNA 2022

Workshop on *Social Responsibility*

DESCRIPTION

The aim of this workshop is to examine a fundamental aspect of moral responsibility through a variety of lenses. The fundamental aspect in question is that moral responsibility in general and our moral responsibility practices in particular are social phenomena. Most theories of moral responsibility focus on one-one cases of moral responsibility, say, one victim blaming one wrongdoer. Do these theories easily extrapolate to cases involving more than one blamer? What happens in cases where the collective, but not necessarily the individual is blameworthy and needs to ask for forgiveness. Our moral responsibility practices do not only focus on properties of the wrongdoer, but also of the blamer. What needs to be true for a blamer to have the proper standing to blame a wrongdoer appropriately? When do our social circumstances impede our agency, and our responsibility?

Embedded Workshop Talks

The Unfairness of Blaming Collectives

Andrés Garcia
Lund University & Humboldt University

ABSTRACT
Blameworthy agents are obliged to apologize. Agents that fulfill their obligations in this regard may become worthy of forgiveness and perhaps even reconciliation with those negatively affected by their actions. The issue is whether these patterns of evaluation are as applicable to collectives as they are to individuals. One reason is the perceived risk of holding collectives responsible unfairly affecting individual group members. One worry is that holding collectives morally responsible by blaming them harms their individual group members. This could be considered unfair in cases where the bad outcomes produced by the collectives lie beyond the intentional control of any of their individual group members. I argue that many of the worries that crop up for the practice of collective responsibility are also relevant to the practice of individual responsibility. It is therefore unclear whether there is something uniquely morally problematic about the former practice but not the latter.

Manipulation in Context

Mattias Gunnemyr
Lund University

ABSTRACT
We tend to excuse agents for their blameworthy behavior if we
learn that they had a particularly poor upbringing, or were
manipulated into acting as they did. The manipulation
argument (Pereboom 2001; Mele 2006) builds on this insight,
and uses it to argue that moral responsibility is incompatible
with causal determinism. As McKenna (2008), Fischer (2011),
Sartorio (2016) and others argue, the manipulation argument
could also be run backwards, showing that manipulated agents
are blameworthy. Thus, we have reached a dialectical stalemate.
I argue that we can do better than this. Intuitions about
blameworthiness vary with context. Relevant contexts for
determining whether someone is blameworthy do not
background the actions and motivations of the potentially
blameworthy agent. However, the contexts that bring out the
manipulation argument friendly intuitions do exactly this. I
suggest a compatibilist account that can explain our varying
intuitions and indicate where the manipulation argument goes
astray.

Proportionality and Blame

Marta Johansson Werkmäster
Lund University

ABSTRACT

Most blame scholars submit that blame ought to be proportionate. Yet, it is undertheorized what it is for blame to be proportionate. In this talk, I explore how we should understand what it is for blame to be proportionate. I argue that what amounts to proportionate blame depends on what "type" of blame we are concerned with - for example, blame or expressions of blame. By moving the standard focus on one-one cases of blame (i.e., cases where one agent blames another agent) to many-one cases of blame (i.e., cases where many agents blame one agent), I argue it becomes clear how different "types" of blame come apart in their proportionality conditions. I end by elaborating on how to blame responsibility in many-one cases.

Relational Blameworthiness

Jakob Werkmäster
Lund University

ABSTRACT

The aim of this talk is to make a philosophically tenable distinction between relational- and non-relational moral responsibility. Previous attempts to incorporate the social element of our moral responsibilities practices have failed to consider properly what effects this has on how we are to view the nature of blameworthiness and praiseworthiness (and value in general). The research therefore fills a gap that is necessary to fill in order to defend and give a comprehensive account of theories that assumes that moral responsibility is inherently interpersonal

and relational. The talk further aims to investigate whether some values such like loveable and blameworthiness are either always relational or have relational and non-relational analogues while other values such as welfare and justice are always non-relational.

Workshop on *Blame: Perspectives And Moral Expectations*

DESCRIPTION

In this workshop, we present new work on the ethics of blame. One issue that we take up is the challenge from free will skepticism that, due to determinism, it is unfair to hold anyone to moral expectations. However, abandoning our moral responsibility practices because they are unfair is also a moral expectation, and hence the argument is self-defeating. Nevertheless, it is arguably unfair to hold particular morally incapacitated agents to moral expectations. We investigate the complex and ambivalent responses we have towards morally incapacitated agents, such as psychopaths, and pay particular attention to the perspective of the victim, who may have reasons to blame these agents where third parties do not. Still, philosophizing about blame should not only focus on the victim's perspective or that of an offended party. Considering the emotional reactions felt from the position of a non-affected third party is important to shed light on the complexities that our blaming practices involve and the conditions under which blaming emotions are fitting. Whether a blaming emotional response is fitting has mostly been framed in terms of what the *blamed* agent must be like for it to be fitting to blame him/her. However, the fittingness of emotions is arguably not only grounded in features of the wrongdoer but might depend on the particular cares and commitments of the prospective blamer.

Embedded Workshop Talks

Hope for Blame: The Victim's Perspective and the Participant Stance

Anton Emilsson
Lund University

ABSTRACT

To engage with each other as responsible agents—to take the participant stance, have interpersonal normative expectations, and experience reactive attitudes—is standardly taken to presuppose some normative competence (NC). An argument against the necessity of NC is the victim objection. The objection is that, when NC implies that the wrongdoer is not blameworthy, if we take the victim's perspective seriously in such cases, we see that it is mistaken to assert NC. Although the objection is impressive, I defend NC. In some cases, the objection fails to deliver its conclusion; indeed, to the contrary, taking the victim's perspective in these cases motivates NC. In other cases, I show that the objection's reliance on a seemingly trivial generalisation is mistaken. I argue that the victim in particular may reasonably have hope for shared normative understanding and thus appropriately blame their perpetrator— while third-parties may not. Thus, the objection fails.

Moral Responsibility and Third-Party Blame

Yuliya Kanygina
University of Gothenburg

ABSTRACT
When we are at the receiving end of the offensive acts or attitudes of others, we typically display anger, resentment, or indignation. Many philosophers take these emotional reactions to be important for understanding the nature of moral responsibility, insofar as they express our demand for accountability. However, in theorizing about responsibility, philosophers focus on second-personal emotional reactions, those that are felt from the position of an offended party or a victim, inadvertently downplaying the practical and theoretical significance of third-party blame – the emotional reactions felt from the position of a non-affected third party.

Third-party blame figures at various levels of our societal life. We feel indignant at the passersby for ignoring a wounded child, and we demand public accountability from people in the spotlight even when we are not directly affected by their actions – as evidenced by the reemergence of cancel culture or public shaming. In this paper, I aim at advancing our understanding of third-party blame by approaching it through the issue about the standing to blame. I will examine the contexts where it is commonly thought inappropriate for a third party to blame wrongdoer in virtue of their position as a third party and propose an account of justification of third-party blame, inspired by the Role-Ideal model of accountability for structural injustice.

A Problem of Incompatibilism

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ABSTRACT

Incompatibilists claim that without libertarian free will we cannot be responsible and be held responsible; therefore, if we accept that determinism is true, we must abandon our reactive attitudes—as a way of holding others responsible. In this paper, I will show that this position is self- defeating. The exact reasons for showing why we should stop holding others responsible, show why we should not stop holding others responsible. I will present my argument in the form of a defence of Strawsonian compatibilism against an objection presented by Paul Russell (1992).

Strawson (1962) claimed that we take objective stance only towards children and people with abnormalities. Nothing regarding the truth of determinism shows that we are like a child or an abnormal person, so it cannot show that we must abandon our reactive attitudes. Russell (1992) criticised Strawson on the ground that he seems to conflate moral incapacity with abnormality. The truth of determinism shows that we are morally incapacitated, and if this is true then it would be unfair to feel reactive attitudes toward the wrongdoer. My main line of argument would be:

(a) Expecting us to abandon our reactive attitudes because they are unfair is a moral expectation.
(b) If determinism is true, we are morally incapacitated.
(C) It is unfair to have a moral expectation from morally incapacitated people.

Therefore, if determinism is true, it is unfair to expect people to abandon their reactive attitudes towards others.

Fitting Blame from The Perspective of The Blamer

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ABSTRACT
The fittingness of blame is commonly thought to depend on facts about the target of blame, i.e., *the blamed agent*. While I do agree with this, I argue that this is not the full picture. Blame is essentially an emotional response and emotions are felt evaluative stances we take towards objects in the world when they strike us as having personal import. Consequently, emotions always display a kind of "value-for-the-subject" structure which can't be ignored. I will thus argue that an account of blame's fittingness must take into account facts about the prospective blamer and her evaluative orientation and that blameworthiness is essentially a relational property which supervenes on both natural features of the target of blame *and* natural features of the blaming agent.

Psychopathy, Fairness, and Ambivalence

Alexander Velichkov
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ABSTRACT
I argue that theoretical constraints stemming from broader issues in the philosophy of free will have come in the way of painting a full picture of psychopathic agency. If we break free of those constraints, however, and allow considerations of a particular form of fairness to enter theories of responsibility, we can better understand the ambivalence we may feel towards psychopathic wrongdoing. On the one hand, there are retributivist and consequentialist reasons to sanction psychopaths for their wrongful acts. On the other hand, a reason of fairness speaks against sanctioning people for their inborn disabilities.

PRESENTATIONS

Meaningful Choices in a Fatalistic World

Per Algander
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ABSTRACT
In game design, "fake choices" are often criticized as a bad feature of games. A fake choice is a situation within a game where the player is presented with different options but where each option leads to the same, or essentially the same, outcome. Such choices, it might seem, are bad features of games in so far as interactiveness or agency is taken to be an especially important aspect of what makes a game a good one. In this talk I will argue that fake choices are not bad-making features of games. Even though the player's choice does not make a difference to the outcome the choice can still be a way for the player to ineract with the game in a meaningful and potentially good-making way. I will also suggest that an upshot of this view of meaningful choices is that choices in the real world can be meaningful, even in a deterministic or fatalistic world.

The Possibility of Incomparability

Henrik Andersson
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ABSTRACT
How do the color blue and the number four relate with respect to their tastiness? Most disregard these cases of 'non-comparability' due to the fact that they seem to be of no interest when discussing practical reasoning. They are taken to be nonsensical and consequently do not cause a problem for everyday practical deliberation. In this paper, non-comparability is treated more carefully and not swiftly judged to be of no philosophical interest. It is argued that non-comparability constitutes the best support for the claim that items can be incomparable. Three arguments that are meant to establish that non-comparability merits more attention is presented. First, it is argued that non-comparability cannot be ruled out as nonsensical on formal grounds. Second, it is argued that there is a possibility that much discussed and interesting comparisons are cases of non-comparability. Third, a possible example of undeniable non-comparability that is interesting from the perspective of practical reasoning is given. It is concluded that non-comparability supports the possibility of incomparability and indeed poses a threat for practical deliberation.

Posthumous Harm and Changing Desires: A Problem for Boonin

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ABSTRACT

David Boonin (2019) presents a desire-satisfactionist account of posthumous harm, where the subject of harm is the antemortem person whose desire is frustrated by a postmortem event. This account relies on the Desire Satisfaction Principle (DSP): If A's act makes a proposition P false, and B wants P to be true, then A's act harms B. According to the Changing Desires Objection, DSP should be rejected because it sometimes yields the implausible result that a future-oriented desire is satisfied even if the agent abandons the desire before its object obtains.

In response, Boonin argues that this result is not implausible if we acknowledge two distinctions: (1) between desires that are conditional on their own persistence and desires that are not, and (2) between harming in a whole-life-sense and harming in a rest-of-life-sense (Boonin, 2019, pp. 80–81). Take Alice: Before her birthday, Alice has an unconditional desire that she get cake on her birthday (D1), but come her birthday she wants ice cream instead (D2). If on her birthday she gets ice cream, then D1 is frustrated which harms her in the whole-life-sense, but D2 is satisfied which benefits her in the rest-of-life-sense.

I argue that this response fails because, in cases where the agent abandons one unconditional desire for another (where their objects are mutually exclusive), the distinction in (2) does not apply. Therefore, the view fails to account for the agent's changing her mind and again yields implausible results. Take Alice*: Alice* first desires that her ashes be scattered in the mountains (D1), and later that they be scattered at the beach (D2). If, once Alice* is dead, Ted scatters her ashes at the beach, D1 is frustrated and D2 is satisfied. Hence, Ted's act both benefits and harms Alice* in the whole-life-sense on Boonin's account.

On Inferential Moral Knowledge: A Defence of Hume's Law

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ABSTRACT
According to Hume's Law we cannot gain moral knowledge through inference from wholly non-moral premises; or, more concisely, we cannot infer an 'ought' from an 'is'. For a long time, this thesis has found widespread support in the literature, for it seems difficult indeed to see how such inferences are supposed to work. Recently however, a number of philosophers (most notably Aaron Zimmerman [2010], Kieran Setiya [2012], and Declan Smithies [forthcoming]) have challenged this orthodoxy and put forward inferential accounts of moral knowledge that violate Hume's Law.

Following their views, we can come to know moral conclusions by inferences from wholly non-moral premises. The problem with Hume's Law, they argue, is that it is only persuasive if we focus on one particular kind of entailment – viz. logical entailment. But, so their argument continues, once we consider other kinds of entailment (e.g. analytic or epistemic entailment) inferences from non-moral premises to moral conclusions are entirely unproblematic.

This paper defends Hume's Law by showing that the new anti-Humean views are unsuccessful. In particular, I argue that even if we accept the proposed kinds of entailment, it still doesn't follow that we can gain moral knowledge through inferences from non-moral premises. I also argue that there is no reason to think that future inferential accounts of moral knowledge will be more successful. Finally, I show that the arguments in this paper give us good reasons to rethink the main motivations underwriting Hume's Law. More specifically, the paper offers a new and improved diagnosis of why Hume's Law holds and thereby promises to put it on firmer footing.

The Truth Conditions of Structured Propositions

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ABSTRACT

The proposition that Socrates is wise is true iff Socrates is wise. But why? Is it because of certain properties of this proposition, perhaps some properties of its "constituents"? Or is this fact fundamental? If so, facts expressed by "propositional T-sentences" are not grounded. Which of these answers is true turns out to be important. Peter Pagin has argued that any account of propositions as structured face a Benacerraf problem, but his objection presupposes that facts about truth conditions are grounded in facts about propositional constituents. Thus, if these facts are instead fundamental, the argument fails. This means that adherents of structured propositions had better take facts about truth conditions to be fundamental.

The question is also crucial for assessing a common kind of adequacy constraint on theories of propositions, that such theories must explain why propositions, as conceived of by the theory, have the truth conditions they have. This constraint has often been used to disqualify theories, but it, too, presupposes that facts about truth conditions are grounded.

While Merricks agrees that facts about truth conditions are fundamental, he takes propositions to be simple. It may seem more difficult to hold the fundamentality claim if one takes propositions to be structured. For it may seem that which truth conditions a proposition has depends on facts about its constituents.

One can actually concede that when propositions are referred to by "structural descriptions", rather than "that"-clauses, the corresponding statements of their truth conditions are not fundamental. However, they can be held to be grounded in the fundamental statement of its truth conditions, where the proposition is instead referred to by a "that"-clause. Although we thereby concede that truth conditions of propositions are in one sense non-fundamental, we can still reject the substantive kind of explanatory constraint on theories of propositions.

Rationality Without Transparency

Karl Bergman
Umeå University

ABSTRACT
Some philosophers have argued that semantic externalism contradicts a certain received view about rationality. This received view consists in two claims: 1) that in order to be rational, a subject must conform her attitudes to the rules of logic (e.g., avoid contradictions among her beliefs); 2) that a subject has transparent epistemic access to whether or not her attitudes meet the requirements of rationality. In defense of the latter "principle of transparency", writers sometimes appeal to the purported normativity of rationality. The normativity of rationality, it is said, presupposes that we have control over whether or not we are rational, and this in turn presupposes transparency. In this paper, I argue that insofar as rationality is normative in the sense that presupposes control, this actually speaks against the principle of transparency.

Dynamic Descriptivism and Moral Disagreement

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ABSTRACT

When two speakers disagree about the moral status of an act, what do they disagree about? Many metaethical theories have struggled to answer this question in a satisfactory way. I present a novel account of moral disagreement for dynamic descriptivism. Dynamic descriptivism adopts a descriptivist semantics for moral sentences, maintaining that the contents of moral sentences are propositions. But the view also adopts a dynamic pragmatic framework, according to which conversations occurs against a background of information that the interlocutors mutually assume to mutually accept. This dimension of communication includes the common ground (which represents mutually assumed beliefs), the question set (which represents mutually assumed questions-under-discussion), and the to-do list function (which represents actions which each interlocutor is committed to performing). I argue that dynamic descriptivism can solve the problem of moral disagreement by appeal to this pragmatic framework. I start by clarifying the details of the framework, and suggest how it can be expanded. The discourse context might include questions-under-discussion in which terms occur as placeholders, which permits a set of alternative answers that employ different readings of the terms. I argue that interlocutors who are engaged in a moral discussion disagree because neither accepts the proposition that the other asserts into the discourse context as an answer to the mutually assumed question-under-discussion.

The main benefit of this account is that it allows that two interlocutors might use the same moral expression with different extensions, but can still explain why there is a conflict between them. The reason is that at the mutually presupposed discourse level, interlocutors assume a question-under-discussion which is neutral across these interpretations. Their assertions are then interpreted as ways to answer this question; which explains that they share a common topic.

Being Morally Responsible for Another's Action

Olle Blomberg
University of Gothenburg

ABSTRACT
I argue that, contrary to what many philosophers have claimed, an agent can be fully morally responsible and blameworthy for another agent's intentional action simply by intentionally creating the conditions for it in a way that causes the action. While some acknowledge that an agent can be responsible for the outcome that the other agent performs an action, I argue that the technical distinction between responsibility for actions and responsibility for outcomes lacks a point in the context of our practice of blaming and holding each other responsible for what we do. In other words, an agent can be fully morally responsible and blameworthy for another's action in the relevantly same way as she is responsible for her own action. This means that socially mediated moral responsibility for action does not require that an agent has authorised another to act on her behalf.

The Epistemic View on Paradox

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ABSTRACT

Paradoxes are a specific type of research problem. Some of these research problems have turned out to be notoriously difficult; in particular in philosophy. Millenia-old paradoxes such as the Liar and the Sorites are still considered to be unsolved, despite the fact that a great number of solutions have been proposed. In addition, there is very little consensus on whether any of the solutions proposed thus far should be considered to be successful.

Part of the explanation for this state of affairs seems to be that we lack clear desiderata on what a solution to a paradox is supposed to accomplish; to date, we have no generally accepted criteria against which to evaluate solutions to paradoxes. In turn, the lack of established desiderata could be attributed to the fact paradox as a phenomenon is not very well understood; although paradoxes appear to put us in a rather distinctive epistemic position, philosophers have had comparatively little to say about what paradoxes are or why they arise.In this paper, I will try to remedy this situation somewhat, by offering a tentative set of desiderata on solutions to paradox. In order to arrive at these desiderata, I will first develop an explication of the concept of philosophical paradox as a paradoxical set, with the aim of getting a better grasp on paradoxes as a class of highly challenging research problems within philosophy.

The proposed explication will reveal a particular underlying epistemic structure that is shared by a significant number of these philosophical problems, although the class of paradoxical sets does not perfectly align with our pre-theoretical concept of paradox. I argue that by focussing on this underlying epistemic structure, we can formulate clearer and more fruitful desiderata on what an adequate solution to a paradox is required to accomplish.

On The Relationship Between Conditional Probabilities And Probabilities Of Conditionals

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ABSTRACT
Some results on the relationship between conditional probabilities and probabilities of conditionals are presented based on two axioms or postulates governing probabilities of conditionals. The first states that the probability of a conditional is probabilistically independent of its antecedent. Given a suitable background logic it characterises the class of conditional measures that satisfy the standard ratio analysis of conditional probability. The second axiom is a generalisation of the first and characterises the class of Popper-measures. Depending on one's perspective one can either reduce conditional probabilities to probabilities of conditionals, or vice versa.

De-Territorialised Legislatively Constituencies: A Conditional Defence

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ABSTRACT

In many contemporary democracies, legislative constituencies are markedly de-territorial. The constituencies are in principle defined territorially so as to each comprise the citizens who reside permanently in a particular area of the national territory, but with the expansion of external voting, legislative constituencies are increasingly re-defined to now also contain external voters who have biographic links to, but are not actually present, on the traditional constituency territory. This paper aims to normatively assess this practice of constituency de-territorialization (within the basic assumption that external voting is desirable or legitimate in the first place). The paper is in five parts. Part 1 describes the practice of constituency de-territorialisation, and shows that it is a globally widespread institutional practice. Part 2 critically considers the view of Rainer Bauböck that constituency de-territorialisation is pro tanto desirable, and it argues that Bauböck's arguments fail to persuasively support this view. Part 3 goes on to argue that constituency de-territorialisation is instead likely to be pro tanto unjustifiable, as de-territorialised constituencies carry two democratic risks – they can hamper legislative deliberation and undercut partisan voter mobilisation – that are unlikely to be positively outbalanced in general. Part 4 continues to argue, though, that de-territorialised constituencies are nonetheless all in all justifiable if one of two circumstances obtain: De-territorialised constituencies are justifiable when the external electorate is large and biographically linked to the same in-country area, as this is a scenario where the democratic risks of

de-territorial constituencies do not actualise. And de-territorialised constituencies are justifiable, too, when the external electorate is small in comparison to ordinary in-country constituencies, and equality of electoral influence, an important democratic value, can be preserved only through de-territorialising constituencies. Part 5 defends this conclusion against the potential objection that the de-territorialisation of constituencies gives as much electoral power to external voters as it does to in-country voters, and the section also rebuts the worry that de-territorialised constituencies may objectionably entail that public policy tracks views and political judgements that are held by external voters only.

A Dispositional Dissolution of Opacity

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ABSTRACT

Frege's puzzle is a central problem in philosophy of language and philosophy of mind, responsible for shaping key discussions decades after its publication. In a recent article, Mandelbaum and Quilty-Dunn (2017) claim that belief-dispositionalism, proposed by, among others, Schwitzgebel (2002), has trouble dealing with the central phenomenon in the puzzle: opacity. In this paper I expound on dispositionalism and offer a strategy for dealing with puzzles of the Freagean sort. In keeping with the main rationale for dispositionalism I argue that simply explicating beliefs seems to dissolve the puzzle in a way that is congenial to several orthogonal, but related debates, in the wake of Frege's seminal paper.

Causal Efficacy of Perceptible Qualities in Aristotle

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ABSTRACT

What causal powers do colors, odors, flavors and other perceptible qualities have? Aristotle seems to grant perceptible qualities the power to generate sense perception in sentient beings: "each of these [sc. qualities] is productive of perception; for they are all called 'perceptible' because they are able to bring about this movement" (SS 6 445b7-8). It is unclear, however, whether he thinks that these qualities can bring about any other effect than the perceptual one. Broadie (1993) and Code (2008) argue that Aristotle, in his account of sense perception, does not refer to any underlying physiological change caused by the qualities to occur in the sentient body during sense perception but merely cites the sentient subject's psychological take on qualities as red, warm, soft, sweet, or pungent. This shows, they contend, that for him, qualities can produce no effect except the perceptual one, that is, merely the effect of making the sentient body aware of themselves. Here, I would like to challenge this commonplace interpretation, adopting an approach not sufficiently explored yet in the secondary literature. I suggest that we should look for contexts, in his extant works, where qualities can still be at work but their work does not necessarily lead to sense perception. I propose to bring into consideration several key passages where qualities are taken to produce changes in insentient bodies in which sense perception is not possible to ensue.

Showing that perceptible qualities are able to bring about material, non-perceptual changes will give us some good evidence to conclude that for Aristotle, perceptible qualities are causal efficacious over bodies, insentient or sentient.

Modelling Intelligence: The Good, The Bad, and The Plural

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ABSTRACT

I argue that artificial intelligence research has been both fuelled and hindered by the use of 'model tasks', that is, tasks the solution of which are taken to be sufficient for, or at least indicative of intelligence. Before AI proper, cybernetics explored model tasks involving basic real-time and world-involving action control aimed at the maintenance of homeostasis, an approach echoed more recently by the embodied AI movement. Logicist AI, in contrast, took as model tasks for intelligence the solution of abstract problems, such as theorem-proving and proficiency in combinatorially complex games, chess having pride of place. Connectionist AI – including the current deep learning wave – despite privileging model tasks tied to learning from 'experience', shares this focus on abstract, disembodied behaviours as key to intelligence, with particular effort being done in language processing, categorisation, and combinatorially complex games, such as Go.

Reliance on model tasks has led to considerable progress in solving those specific tasks, but against expectation they did not lead to theoretical insights about the nature of intelligence in general, and how to build it. This outcome, I argue, is in part due to the failure of recognising the limited scope of model tasks, as well as the abstractions and idealisations of real-world intelligent behaviour that they embody.

All mainstream frameworks in AI research, in brief, focus on circumscribed, idealised models of intelligent behaviour, those for which the respective approaches tend to generate cumulative progress and satisfactory solutions. Such models, however, abstract or idealise away important features of intelligence, and, if left unchecked, close off potentially rewarding paths of research.

Bringing to the fore the limitations tied to such model task choices, as well as the abstractions and idealisations involved in each, I argue, opens the way for a more integrative and plural approach to AI.

Arbitrary Abstraction and Logicality

Ludovica Conti
Università di Pavia

ABSTRACT
In this talk, I will discuss a criterion (weak invariance) that has been recently suggested in order to argue for the logicality of abstraction operators, when they are understood as arbitrary expressions (cf. Boccuni Woods 2020). The issue of logicality of the abstractionist vocabulary was originally raised within the seminal abstractionist program, Frege's Logicism, and represents, still today, a crucial topic in the abstractionist debate. My double aim consists in inquiring this topic both from a formal and from a philosophical point of view. On the one side, I will argue that, while weak invariance is not satisfied (except for specific exceptions) by first-order abstraction principles (APs), it characterises a wide range of higher-order ones.

More precisely, by comparing respective schemas of first-order and second-order APs, we will note that logicality (in the chosen meaning) mirrors a relevant distinction between same-order and different-order abstraction principles. So, after discussing the controversial case of Ordinal Abstraction, I will note that, if we accept an ar- bitrary interpretation of APs, not only Neologicism (based on HP), but many current abstractionist programs and even the consistent revisions of Frege's Logicism (based on weakened versions of BLV) are able to achieve the logicality ob jective.

On the other side, from a philosophical point of view, I will discuss the role of arbitrariness as a condition for the adoption of the abovementioned logicality criterion. Particularly, I will argue that, on the one hand, the arbitrary interpre- tation could be considered as the most faithful to abstractionist theories, but, on the other hand, it includes semantic insights that are radically alternative to Logicism. In order to argue for this latter consideration, an analogy between the arbitrary interpretation of the APs and the semantics of some eliminative structuralist reconstructions of the scientific theories will be illustrated.

Knowing Who and Knowing How: Understanding, Reference, and Aboutness

Niklas Dahl
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ABSTRACT
Understanding, in a linguistic sense, is usually what we aim for when we try to communicate; we want the hearer to comprehend what we're saying. But just what does it mean to understand an expression or utterance? I will discuss a general notion of understanding an expression as a kind of skill, requiring both knowledge how to use it and cognitive recognition of that knowledge how. Understanding of an utterance of that expression is then, in turn, a matter of deploying that competence in a particular conversational context. In this talk I will apply this approach to analyse how we understand utterances of singular terms, identifying two communicative functions played by singular terms. These roles, talking-about and picking-out, are distinguished by the different knowledge how we needed to understand that function and, for singular terms. This brings us to the topic of knowledge who which, on my view, should be understood as the information required to deploy understanding of a singular term to a particular conversation. By thinking of knowledge who as relative to a conversational purpose, we can respond to the criticism that it is to context dependent to be part of what it takes to refer. As such, I will argue that it's plausible to think that reference, as normally thought of, breaks down into two distinct notions. Further, since the situations where "picking-out" and "talking-about" functions are primary correspond closely to the cases used to argue for and against the need for a cognitive fix to refer, taking this view allows us to accept that both sides of this debate are right.

Penelope and the Drinks

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University of Michigan

ABSTRACT

Penelope wants to go out for a drink. But she knows that once she finishes one drink, she will want to have another one, even though this will make her poorly off tomorrow. In other words, Penelope expects her later self to prefer an outcome that she now wants to avoid. It is widely believed that expected utility theory requires an agent in Penelope's situation to stay home in order to prevent her later self from thwarting her current preference for a productive day tomorrow, even though this means sacrificing the one drink that both her current and later self wants. But this seems wrong. Following this recommendation seems to make Penelope an irrational neurotic who fears the autonomy of her future self. If expected utility theory were to require Penelope to stay home, then that would put serious pressure on it as a normative ideal for temporally extended agents. In this paper I argue that it does not. Contrary to the common view, it is not necessarily expected utility-maximizing to tie oneself to the proverbial mast, even when this means trusting a future self with diverging preferences.

Just like it can be prudent to build a cooperative reputation in repeated interactions, Penelope's later self has a strategic incentive to forsake the second drink in order to prove to her future self that she can be trusted with decisions like this. This incentive can in turn make it rational for current Penelope to trust her later self with the decision today. I conclude that once we recognize the utility of being trustworthy to oneself over time, expected utility theory emerges as a more plausible normative guide for temporally extended agents, and one that permits Penelope her drink.

Is Parfit Mistaken Regarding the First Mistake in Moral Mathematics?

Salomon de Leeuw
Lund University

ABSTRACT
In Reasons and Persons (1984) Parfit presents a few so called "mistakes in moral mathematics". One of which is the mistake of following The Share-of-The-Total View. Parfit claims that The Share-of-The-Total View is a mistake and a principle that tells one to act immorally. The principle gives the "wrong answer". In this paper, I argue that Parfit's argument for why this is the case is based upon a false premise. The premise is false because Parfit's definition of "saving a life" is a problematic one. Since Parfit utilises a problematic definition of "saving a life" his argument is only prima facie correct. However, if one replaces Parfit's definition of "saving a life" with a more reasonable one, then his argument no longer proves that The Share-of-The-Total View is a principle that gives the wrong moral answer.

The Bouba/Kiki Effect and the Gesture Theory of Language Evolution: Mapping Movement to Prosody

Axel Ekström, Lund University
Jens Nirme, Lund University
Peter Gärdenfors, Lund University

ABSTRACT

The Gesture Theory of language origins states that human spoken language evolved "from hand to mouth." One way of supporting this theory would be to show that movements can be metaphorically mapped onto prosodic patterns by humans – a hypothesis that is testable by experiments. In implementing such an experiment, we draw on previous research in cognitive linguistics. Researchers have consistently found that speech sounds are non-arbitrarily mapped onto the visual shape of objects. This phenomenon is known as the bouba/kiki effect and has been repeatedly replicated. For the prosody-movement mapping hypothesis, a similar paradigm is applicable using speech sounds.

For this purpose, one promising route of investigation is that of tonal languages, such as Mandarin Chinese. While pitch is used in all languages to distinguish words (e.g., to express emotion), in tonal languages they also affect the semantic contents of words. Mandarin Chinese, being tonal, is prosodically arranged in five tones – flat (yīn píng), rising (yáng píng), dipping (shǎng), falling (qù), and neutral (qīng) – each with distinctive pitch. These speech sounds present a range of stimuli for investigating the possible non-arbitrariness of semantics.

In this first-time exploration, we seek to investigate the possibility of prosodic-gestural mapping in an online experiment that parallels the bouba/kiki investigations. In the experiment, participants are tasked with mapping a series of Mandarin one-syllable words, rising or falling in pitch onto one of two film stimuli intended as either congruent or incongruent matches, showing either falling (e.g., a character or object falling) or rising (e.g., a character or object being flung into the air) motions in space. We aim to present the full results of this work. Implications for the gesture theory of language evolution, and directions for future research will be also discussed.

An Alternative Approach to Dependence Logic

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ABSTRACT
Dependence logic was developed by Väänänen (2007) building on work by Henkin (1961) on partially ordered quantifiers, Hintikka and Sandu (1989) on IF-logic, and Hodges (1997) on compositional semantics for IF-logic. In Dependence logic a formula is satisfied by a set of assignments, a team, rather than a single assignment.

In general, team semantics is, compared to standard Tarskian semantics, a more expressive framework that can be used to express logical connectives, operations and atoms that cannot be expressed using Tarskian semantics. This includes branching, or partially ordered, quantifiers, notions of dependence and independence, hyperproperties in linear-time temporal logic (LTL), and probabilistic notions. Therefore, even though the syntax of Dependence logic is first-order the logical strength is that of existential second-order logic (ESO).

The dominant method to give a logic, such as first-order logic, a team semantics relies heavily on the powerset lift: The denotation of a formula in team semantics is the powerset of the denotation of the formula in standard Tarskian semantics. It has been argued that this powerset lift is canonical and "forced" upon us.

In this talk I will define an alternative lift that gives rise to a new semantics for Dependence logic. This will challenge the view that the powerset construction is canonical. In fact, it seems that this alternative semantics is better suited to deal with branching quantifiers, the main reason for Hintikka to introduce IF-logic.

Taking Skepticism Seriously: Descartes's Meditations as a Cognitive Exercise and the Cartesian Epochē

Jan Forsman
Tampere University

ABSTRACT
Descartes's Meditations is a truly influential work, transforming the way philosophers both then and now approach epistemological and metaphysical issues. Its most famous aspects are the skeptical inquiry by the method of doubt, seeking an unprejudiced fresh start while undermining skepticism, and the rational foundationalist metaphysics, discarding Aristotelian Scholasticism while making way for the period's New Science. Many studies have been written about these topics, yet there is a remarkable absence of systematic reading against both the skeptical and Scholastic traditions. Studies tend to make a choice, focusing either on Descartes's metaphysical project, reading it against Scholastic doctrine, or on skeptically driven epistemology, reading it against skeptical history.

However, these areas are not separate. Descartes's use of skepticism is closely connected with his metaphysical and cognitive projects, aiming to overturn both Scholasticism and skepticism. I argue for an understanding of Descartes's method of doubt as a meditative skeptical exercise, targeted against both skeptical and Scholastic positions. I draw from the historical genre of spiritual exercises, or meditations, prominent especially in the 16th and 17th century, that formed a part of the religious-cultural background of the period when Descartes wrote. I likewise argue for a novel interpretation of Descartes's skepticism in the Meditation where the skeptical enquiry is a serious effort to overcome both the Aristotelian-Scholastic framework and skeptical tradition, with intended metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical results.

I begin by mapping previous key interpretations of Descartes's skeptical procedure and relation to skeptical and Aristotelian tradition. Next, I advance a reading of the skeptical inquiry as a cognitive exercise against the historical background of the meditative literature of 1500–1600's. Finally I discuss how such a reading leads us to take the skeptical inquiry sincerely: not just as a tool, a form of play-acting, but a genuine exercise requiring practice and effort.

Disagreement for Contextualists

Ragnar Francén
University of Gothenburg

ABSTRACT
Contextualists about different sorts of judgments (judgments about taste, moral judgments, epistemic modals etc.) face the challenge of explaining disagreement, given that contextualism seems to imply that people speak and think past each other rather than genuinely disagree. In a recent paper (forthcoming) I defended a novel view about how moral contextualists can account for moral disagreements. The account builds on the observation that (deontic) moral judgments have "practical direction" in the sense that they are judgments that one can act in accordance or discordance with: for example, dancing tango is to act in discordance with the judgment that dancing tango is morally wrong, and in accordance with the judgment that dancing tango is obligatory. The idea, then, is that deontic moral disagreement can be understood as clashes in practical direction: roughly, A and B morally disagree if, and only if, some way of acting is in accordance with A's judgment but in discordance with B's.In this talk I will argue that this kind of explanation can be extended and used by contextualists about other kind of judgments, such as contextualism about epistemic modals. Epistemic modal judgments – e.g., "Putin might be insane" – don't have practical direction in the same sense as deontic moral judgments, since they are not judgments that one can act in accordance or discordance with. But a person's epistemic state can be in accordance or discordance with the judgment. According to the account of disagreement I propose, A and B have an epistemic modal disagreement if, and only if, some epistemic state is in accordance with A's judgment and in discordance with B's judgment.

Openness and Mutability

Nils Franzén
Umeå University

ABSTRACT
It's a fundamental feature of our experience of the world that the past appears to us as settled, whereas part of what is to come is not yet settled. What I had for breakfast yesterday is already determined. The results of the winter Olympics in 2030, by contrast, are not yet settled.

A common diagnosis of the openness of the future is that contingent statements about the future are neither true nor false. A problem with this view is that it seems incompatible with the assertability of future-directed sentences. We face a dilemma: On the one hand we have the openness intuition, on the other hand we consider future contingents to be assertible and to have truth-values. Future facts thus seem to be settled in advance.

In this talk, I consider a way out of the dilemma, inspired by a theory advocated by Geach:

• Future contingents are generally true or false.

• Future contingents concern the current direction of the world. What is going to happen.

• What is going to happen can be prevented from happening.

To illustrate the proposal, consider Geach's own example:

Karl is witnessing a plane heading for the ground in a very fast and uncontrolled manner. He cries out:

(1) The plane will crash!

But by an incredible manoeuvre, the pilot then manages to stabilize the plane just before it hits the ground. On Geach's view, Karl's assertion was true, and still is. The plane was going to crash. Nevertheless, the plane never crashed. The event was prevented.

This proposal combines the notion that statements about the future have truth values, which explains their assertability, with the notion that the corresponding facts are unsettled. What will happen can be prevented from happening. The latter featureaccounts for the openness of the future.

Side-Stepping the Frege-Geach Problem

Will Gamester, University of Leeds
Graham Bex-Priestley, University of Leeds

ABSTRACT
Unlike traditional, "pure" expressivists, hybrid expressivists maintain that a moral judgement is a hybrid state, composed in part by a desire-like attitude, but also in part by a belief (Ridge 2006, 2007, 2014; Schroeder 2013; Toppinen 2013). Hybrid expressivists are thought to have an easier time solving the Frege-Geach Problem, since they can "offload" the explanation of the logico-semantic properties of moral sentences onto the belief-components of the hybrid states they express. Our talk has a destructive component and a constructive component.First, we show that the "offloading" strategy is inadequate as it stands. By the hybrid expressivist's lights, the truth of the belief-component of a moral judgement is neither necessary nor sufficient for the truth of the judgement as a whole. So, that the belief-components of a set of moral judgements are, say, inconsistent with each other does not entail that the moral judgements themselves are inconsistent with each other.

So, the inconsistency of the belief-components is insufficient to explain the inconsistency of the sentences that express the hybrid states.Second, we articulate a new approach to solving the Frege-Geach Problem, which employs the "Expressivist Sidestep" (Dreier 2015). Rather than explaining what it is for a set of moral sentences to be inconsistent, the expressivist should explain what it is to think that a set of sentences is inconsistent. Inconsistency is a modal notion – sentences are inconsistent when they cannot all be true – so we illustrate this strategy by utilising two hybrid expressivist accounts of modal judgements (Lenman 2003; Ridge 2015).

This "earns the right" to talk of inconsistency, but it goes further: we show that, on either account, the state expressed by, e.g., "p' and '¬p' are inconsistent' cannot be rationally rejected. We thus obtain a transcendental solution to the Frege-Geach Problem.

Millianism Generalised and Interpreted

Andrés Garcia, Lund University & Humboldt University
Henrik Andersson, Lund University

ABSTRACT
John Stuart Mill is often interpreted as saying that there are intellectual pleasures and physical pleasures and that no amount of the latter is better than any amount of the former. In the following paper, we attempt to illuminate the general notion of superiority to which he appealed by showing that its underlying structure occurs not only where items are better/worse than other items, but also where items are equally good or on a par. We also provide an interpretation of this type of value relation that avoids invoking the notions of infinite value and diminishing marginal value.

Should Theories of Validity Self-Apply?

Marco Grossi
Oxford University

ABSTRACT

Validity is commonly defined as preservation of truth in all interpretations. Often, a theory of validity applies to the language of interpretations: it self-applies. Firstly, I claim that self-applicability is essential. The debate between the monist an the pluralist about logical consequence can be properly expressed only if the system self-applies. For the monist will likely want to say that an axiom holds in all cases, and in particular in her case. Yet, if the system does not self-apply, her case is not covered. Similarly, some normative constrains that ought to arise because of her upholding the monist's position cannot be made sense of, for she cannot apply her theory to her case.

Why would someone not want self-application? Here are two arguments:

1) A Tarskian argument. A theory of interpretations for L should contain the intended interpretation of L, where truth in that interpretation is truth for L. Yet, truth for L is not definable in L, via Tarski's theorem.

2) Williamson gave the following argument: a theory of interpretations for a predicate P should be able to provide all the possible interpretations of P. If P is interpreted as F in I, then, for any x, Px if and only if F is true of x in I. But then suppose we can interpret P as "x is not an interpretation under which P is true of x". Then there is an I where P is true of I in I if and only if P is not true of I in I.

I defend self-applicability against both. I think we should reject the idea that truth requires a full T-schema. If so, (1) fails. I show how (2) has a hidden Tarskian assumption, as well, so it fails if we do not require a T-schema.

What We Mean as What We Said or Would Have Said

Hubert Hågemark
Lund University

ABSTRACT

We normally mean what we say, but sometimes we don't. When I ironically utter "What lovely weather" on a rainy day, or mistakenly utter "Jim is a barn door" instead of "Jim is a darn bore.", I say one thing and mean another. However, although utterances like these are not uncommon, they are greatly overshadowed by the volume of humdrum utterances of "There is wine in the fridge" or "I really like nachos" where we mean what we say. Since we normally mean what we say, the following simple thesis will be correct in normal situations.

(N) S meant that p by uttering e iff S said that p by uttering e.

This begs the question of whether (N) can be refined in order to also cover situations where we don't mean what we say. In this talk we explore whether (N) can be refined modally, by offering an analysis where speaker meaning in normal situations is identified with what is actually said, and in other situations with what the speaker would have said in certain counterfactual situations. The analysis constitutes a radical, but welcome, break with Gricean orthodoxy, where linguistic meaning, rather than speaker meaning, is ultimately used to explain other semantic notions.

On Entitlement

Mira Hannegård
Uppsala University

ABSTRACT
The term entitlement has been skewed. The word is often used to mean two wholly contradictory things. (a) that a person is justifiably owed something and, (b) that a person unjustifiably feels that they are owed something. The first is prominent in legal literature whereas the other has gained prominence in contemporary philosophical debates where, e.g., Kate Manne likens entitlement to harmful privilege. I will be conceptualising what it means when someone claims to be entitled, under what circumstances this is true and under which it is not.

Discussions on 'entitlements' (and 'rights' which I believe to be a category of entitlements) have immense value when we discuss issues in politics, justice, and ethics. In the last two years two books in philosophy have been released that deals with issues of entitlement and rights: Kate Manne's previously mentioned "Entitled: How Male Privilege Hurts Women" (2020), and Amia Srinivasan's "The Right to Sex" (2021). Each book discusses issues of perceived entitlement, yet neither properly accounts for the usage of the terms. Can you have a right to sex? Can entitlements hurt others?

This paper answers these questions, but also it will, on a larger scale, conceptualise entitlement. I argue that a person can have different types of entitlements and that these are justified in reference to social contract or law. I also argue for the introduction of the term 'illentitlement', a term I use to refer to utterances and acts of entitlement where this utterance/act is illegitimate or unjustified as it does not correlate with any socially agreed practice. I claim that both Manne's and Srinivasan's discussions are about 'illentitlements'.

This particular paper is part of a larger project in epistemology but is also well suited for discussions in political philosophy, feminist philosophy and to some extent ethics.

Fixing Person-Based Stakes in Distributive Theory

Anders Herlitz
Institute for Futures Studies

ABSTRACT
This paper outlines an often-overlooked distinction in distributive theory, expounds its importance and introduces hitherto underexplored problems with theories that rely of references to individuals' claims or complaints. Many distributive theories are framed so that outcomes are evaluated with reference to what is "at stake" for different individuals. Some frameworks make reference to individuals' claims (e.g. claim prioritarianism), whereas others make reference to individuals' complaints (e.g. minimax complaints approaches). But there are different ways to think of individuals' stakes and how they are fixed. The paper presents three views of how to fix stakes: (i) "the input stakes view" which says that an individual's stake associated with an outcome is a function of how well off they are in the outcome and how well off they are if nothing is done; (ii) "the global stakes across outcomes view" which says that an individual's stake associated with an outcome is a function of how well off they are in the outcome and how well off they are in the outcome that is best for them; (iii) "the binary stakes across outcomes view" which says that an individual's stake associated with an outcome is a function of how well off they are in the outcome and how well off they are in the one unique outcome with which it is compared. It is shown that each of the views faces theoretical problems.

The input stakes view sometimes make distributive theories unstable so that they recommend constantly changing one's mind. The global stakes across outcomes view sometimes make distributive theories violate requirements of rationality. The binary stakes across outcomes view sometimes make distributive theories generate cyclical evaluations. A fourth view is introduced and discussed, but some questions regarding whether this view can be understood as an interpretation of individuals' stakes are raised.

Quine's Underdetermination Thesis

Eric Johannesson
Stockholm University

ABSTRACT

In On Empirically Equivalent Systems of the World from 1975, Quine formulated a thesis of underdetermination roughly to the effect that every scientific theory has an empirically equivalent but logically incompatible rival, one that cannot be discarded merely as a terminological variant of the former. For Quine, the truth of this thesis was an open question. If true, some would argue that it undermines any belief in scientific theories that is based purely on their empirical success. But despite its potential significance, surprisingly little has been done by way of establishing or refuting it. My aim is to establish the thesis for as large a class of theories as possible. I will make the idealizing assumption that a theory is a set of sentences of a first-order single-sorted language without function symbols whose predicates can be partitioned into an empirical and a theoretical part. Relative to such a partition, various notions of empirical equivalence can be defined, corresponding to proposals in the literature.

These notions are presented and ordered by logical strength. I briefly investigate some necessary and sufficient conditions for finding empirically equivalent but logically incompatible rivals to a given theory, and introduce the problem of saying when such a rival is to be regarded as a terminological variant of the former, also known as the problem of theoretical equivalence. I present various solutions to this problem from the literature and order them by logical strength. I show that, under any combination of said notions of empirical and theoretical equivalence, Quine's thesis applies to all consistent and recursive theories that postulate infinitely many theoretical entities.

Late Idealism and the Rise of Empiricism in the North

Lauri Kallio
University of Turku

ABSTRACT
The paper addresses Thiodolf Rein's (1838–1919) view of empiricist philosophies, which arrived in the Nordic countries in the second half of the nineteenth century. Rein was the key figure of Finnish philosophy towards the end of the century: he was the only professor of philosophy in Finland. Rein was a Swedish-speaking Finn and well-connected to his Nordic colleagues.Idealist philosophy had a strong foothold in all Nordic countries throughout the 19th century. In Finland and in Norway, G.F.W. Hegel's (1770−1831) philosophy dominated the philosophical discussion for a long time. At the early stage of his career Rein advocated Hegel's idealism as well.

However, since the early 1870s he was strongly influenced by Hermann Lotze (1817–81), probably the most distinguished German philosopher of the time. Lotze's idealist philosophy gained popularity also in Sweden.

Since the 1880s Rein's idealist standpoint was challenged by the younger generation. In particular Edvard Westermarck (1862–1939), the most renowned Finnish philosopher internationally since the 1890s, favored an empiricist approach to philosophy. Charles Darwin's (1809−82) theory of evolution formed the basis of his philosophy. At the turn of the 1890s Westermarck criticized Rein's metaphysics in several occasions.

In his main work, "Försök till en framställning af psykologin eller vetenskapen om själen" (Attempt at a presentation of psychology, or the science of the soul, 1876–1891), Rein replies to his critics. In short, Rein attempts to reconcile modern natural science and its empirical methodology with idealist metaphysics. His chief concern is to refute the claim that the results of natural science corroborate materialism. At the same time, he makes it very clear that any future philosophy must be in harmony with empirical facts. Whereas Lotze had only shortly commented on Darwin's theory of evolution, Rein argues that Darwin's theory testifies to idealist metaphysics.

Open Texture: Characterization and Some Implications

Martin Kaså
University of Gothenburg

ABSTRACT
The notion of open texture ("porosity of concepts") was introduced by Friedrich Waismann in his 1945 paper "Verifiability" as a kind of indeterminacy (or underdetermination) of linguistic meaning that seems unavoidable for most of our empirical concepts. Though this shares some properties with the more familiar, and vastly more discussed, vagueness of concepts, open texture is a distinct phenomenon. According to Waismann at least, we can in principle eliminate (or at least mitigate) vagueness by presenting more accurate rules of application of our terms, but openness is eternal; there will always be potential unforeseen situations where our definitions – however precise and well-written they are – will not give us satisfactory guidance for application.

Though many analytic philosophers are at least vaguely aware of this notion, it is – or so I will argue – an under-researched and underused tool in philosophy of language and general philosophical methodology.

There has recently been some resurgence of interest in Waismann's work and his notion of open texture in particular, and in this talk I will examine recent attempts at clarifying and characterizing this conceptual porosity. I will also briefly comment on its place in a broader picture of meaning indeterminacy, on whether openness may apply to "non-empirical" concepts, and on why a proper understanding of this phenomenon may indeed have important consequences for philosophy in general.

On the Plausibility of Structural Complicity

Meradjuddin Khan Oidermaa
Stockholm University

ABSTRACT

In recent years philosophers, political scientists and social critics have argued that "traditional" philosophical accounts of complicity are inadequate. (Williams, 2019; Corwin & Jaggar, 2018; Knowles, 2021; Mihai, 2019; Applebaum, 2010.). These authors argue that traditional accounts – such as a causal contribution account (Lepora & Goodin, 2013) or a participatory intentions style account (Kutz, 2000)– cannot accommodate a novel type of complicity which they call structural complicity. They propose a variety of reasons for thinking that these traditional philosophical accounts cannot explain the existence of structural complicity.

There are two central themes to their objections. One, traditional accounts build on a conception of responsibility which is too backwards looking, and hence fail to offer the correct action guidance for fixing the harm caused by social structures. Two, they argue that the traditional account has to strong of a requirement on individuals intentional action, making them unable to explain the ways in which individuals cannot help but to unintentionally reinforce and normalize harmful social structures. In light of these failures, they proceed to offer novel explanations for how to accommodate the existence of structural complicity. I argue three things. First, traditional philosophical accounts of complicity either a) already have the tools to overcome the objections levied against them or b) can be updated to overcome the challenges.

Second, the novel accounts of structural complicity have to rely heavily on notions of causal contribution or participatory intentions to have a satisfactory explanation of structural complicity. Third, given that structural complicity has to be grounded in an individuals causal contribution, or participatory intentions, it does not look intuitive anymore that there is such a thing as structural complicity.

How Not to Ground Moral Principles on Indeterminacy

Jiwon Kim
Lund University

ABSTRACT
It seems intuitive that the following holds: the fact that the ball is red and round obtains in virtue of the fact that it is red and the fact that it is round. The global fact that the ball is red and round is grounded on two particular facts that the ball is red and that the ball is round. Despite its intuitiveness, Barnes (2014) poses an interesting problem which she calls "the failure of grounding": there might be cases where global or macro features are not grounded in or determined by facts about basic particles.

If there are such cases, this phenomenon of failure of grounding extends to metaethics. Suppose that Jane and John are drowning, and only one person can be saved. It is definitely the case that one is obligated to save Jane or John, but it is not definitely the case that one is obligated to save Jane. Nor is it the case that one is obligated to save John. While there is no obligation to save a particular person, there is a moral obligation to save one of the two particulars. According to Barnes, this is an example of grounding failure which can be explained by fundamental indeterminacy.

This paper argues that while a metaphysical conjunctive fact – e.g., the ball is red and round – is grounded in particular facts, a disjunctive moral fact – e.g., one has a moral obligation to save Jane or John – is not grounded in them. It is because a disjunctive fact is ontologically more prior than particular facts. This disjunction provides scope for a moral agent to decide whether to save Jane or John. This scope provided by a disjunction is indeterminate yet virtuous because the content is completed by the reasonable choice of a moral agent.

The Problem of Domain in Population Axiology

Karsten Klint Jensen
University of Copenhagen

ABSTRACT
As domain for his impossibility theorem for population axiologies, Arrhenius assumes that the set of welfare levels satisfies Discreteness, i.e. that for any pair of welfare levels, there is a finite number of welfare levels in between. Alternatively, he could have assumed Denseness, i.e. there is a welfare level in between any pair of welfare levels. He does not present much argument in favor of Discreteness. But he does claim that the plausibility and validity of the theorems does not depend on whether Discreteness is true or not. He supports this claim with an argument, which has been repeated word to word several times.

The argument purports to show that if Denseness is true of the set of welfare levels, then an arbitrarily fine-grained subset can be formed, of which Discreteness is true, and such that the adequacy conditions are intuitively plausible for subsets of the dense set, and the impossibility of satisfying them can be proved.

This argument has not received much interest in the literature, and to my knowledge none that focuses on the core claim. The aim of this talk is to analyze and assess this argument. Analysis is needed because it is not entirely clear how exactly the conclusion of the argument should be understood. I shall propose what I find the most charitable reading as regards the overall intention. Then I shall demonstrate what seems to me faulty about the argument: A subset of welfare levels, for which Discreteness is true, can never be *arbitrarily* fine grained in the sense necessary to make the adequacy conditions plausible for subsets of the dense set of welfare levels. If I am right about this, it would seem to indicate that it *does* make a difference for population axiology whether we assume Discreteness or Denseness.

Metaphysics For Anti-Representationalists?

Jonathan Knowles
Norwegian University of Science and Technology

ABSTRACT
Anti-representationalism sidelines the idea that we should understand our thought and talk by relating it to a mind-independent reality. It is connected to deflationary views concerning the realism/anti-realism debate, but leaves open whether a lot of what else goes under the rubric of metaphysics is also suspect. I examine this question via critical discussion of Amie Thomasson's views, insofar as she seems to evince sympathy for the central ideas behind AR. Thomasson thinks many metaphysical questions can be answered 'easily' by conceptual analysis and logical inference.

Recently she has conceded that some central metaphysical issues do not seem susceptible to this rendering but has suggested we can see them as normatively conceptual, as concerning metalinguistic negotiations about how to use the relevant concepts. I argue this picture faces problems and further that Thomasson's view, in operating with distinctively empirical warrant, is not in the spirit of AR. I present my own conception of metaphysics for AR which lays stress on the continuity between conceptual innovation and trying to say something true about the issues in question, closing with some reflections on the possible basis for a distinction between science and metaphysics based on the function they play in our lives.

Interventionism, Non-Reductive Physicalism, and Causal Model-Building

Thomas Kroedel
University of Hamburg

ABSTRACT
Non-reductive physicalism is one of the dominant views about the mind. Interventionism is one of the dominant views about causation. Can the two views be combined to allow for physical effects of the mind? This has turned out to be a difficult question. In the talk, I argue that the difficulty persists if one tries to accommodate mental causation by making merely minimal adjustments to the original interventionist theory. The original interventionist theory say that one variable causes another variable (very roughly) iff changing the first variable yields changes in the second variable, given that other variables are appropriately held fixed. What other variables should be held fixed when assessing whether a (variable representing a) mental event causes a physical event?

If non-reductive physicalism is true, mental events are necessitated by certain physical events that are their supervenience bases. Should these physical events be represented in a model and held fixed when assessing the efficacy of mental events? If so, there's a danger that they screen off the mental events from (what seem to be) their physical effects. According to some recent suggestions (including a suggestion by Lei Zhong), we can hold on to the original holding-fixed requirements of interventionism and still accommodate mental causation for non-reductive physicalism.

In the talk, I criticize these suggestions. I argue that they might work if supervenience bases are represented in an interventionist causal model in certain tailor-made ways; it turns out, however, that variables corresponding to mental events don't qualify as causes any more once the physical level is represented at a sufficient level of detail. Adequately representing certain cases requires such a level of detail. But once the detail is added, the mental variables can no longer be manipulated if the variables at the physical level are held fixed.

Vad är en (Il)lokut Handling?

Felix Larsson
University of Gothenburg

ABSTRACT
När Austin skiljer mellan lokuta och illokuta talhandlingar urskiljer han en sorts lokuta handlingar som han kallar »retiska«: de exempel han ger är 1) att säga att något är på ett visst sätt, 2) att säga åt någon att göra något, 3) att fråga huruvida något är på ett visst sätt. Searle argumenterade 1969 för att dessa tre talhandlingstyper rimligen borde klassas som illokuta, och de flesta har nog sedan dess varit böjda att hålla med honom. Jag förklarar varför Austin trots allt hade en poäng, hur man kan och varför man bör räkna detta att ett yttrande innebär att talaren säger att, säger åt eller frågar huruvida som en del av det semantiska innehållet i yttrandet snarare än som den illokuta kraften med vilket innehållet förmedlas. Kort sagt är illokuta handlingar handlingar som innebär att talaren (och kanske även andra deltagare i ett samtal) iklär sig olika åtaganden. Vilka åtaganden man förpliktigar sig till i och med ett yttrande avgör vilken illokut kraft yttrandet har (= vilken illokut handling som utförs). Men det är fullt möjligt att säga att något är på ett visst sätt, att säga åt någon att göra något och att fråga huruvida något är si eller så utan att därmed göra några åtaganden. Så det måste finnas en bemärkelse i vilken dessa handlingar inte är illokuta. Det visar sig att det som på svenska har kallats »ikuggning« och »allvarligt tal« är centrala begrepp för en redogörelse för gränsen mellan det lokuta och det illokuta. En förklaring av de retiska akternas innebörd kan rätt lätt skisseras med hjälp av de grundläggande idéerna bakom lingvistiska och språkfilosofiska teorier om »conversational scoreboards«.

Deference Incorporated

Olof Leffler
University of Vienna

ABSTRACT
Moral deference pessimists think agents who defer to others' moral judgements may or may not act rightly, but cannot act well: famously, some think they cannot act virtuously or with moral merit because they lack moral understanding (Hills, 2009; Schroeder, 2021). Moral deference optimists disagree. However, the literature usually focuses on deference to individuals. I shall argue that deference to collectives, which seems common in real life, avoids optimistic objections and supports pessimism.

Case: Kim works for a large Swedish gastropub chain. Kim does not consider the firm a moral superior, but ordinarily trusts others' judgements. Without consulting stakeholders, the board of the chain decides to start importing the meat they sell from another country, even though this increases animal suffering and CO_2 emissions. They confirm that the decision is made for profit, but attempt to justify it morally by saying that it is legal. Kim believes them, repeats the legality argument to friends, and does not consider leaving the firm.

Whether or not the firm is in the right or generally morally legitimate, Kim believes and acts on the judgement of someone who is not a moral superior (or taken to be one) and who gives a very poor reason (what is legal need not be moral). This is deference without moral understanding.

Now, some optimists think deference to moral superiors may improve our actions (Sliwa, 2012; Enoch, 2014). But the chain is no moral superior and no one believes it is. Others think deference can have value: we may minimize epistemic injustices by respectfully listening to the voices of the oppressed and form joint epistemic subjects (Wiland, 2017; 2021) or act appropriately in intimate relations (McShane, 2018). But the firm does not listen to stakeholders and is not intimately related to Kim. Deference to collectives supports pessimism.

Interactional Interpretation and Interpretive Pluralism

Palle Leth
Dalarna University

ABSTRACT
Taking conversational interaction as a model for thinking about interpretation suggests that the hearer H has three interpretive options with respect to the speaker S's utterance U. H may take an interest in

1) what S wants to say (cooperative, default approach where H sets out to discover S's intended meaning),

2) what S is most reasonably taken to say (conflictual approach; normative consequences being at stake, H holds S responsible for H's interpretation of U),

3) what S could be imagined to say (playful approach where H proposes a merely possible meaning of U, e.g. for the purpose of merriment).

One implication of the interactional model is that there is no reason to posit such a thing as the correct meaning of a work. The debate between intentionalists and anti-intentionalists on whether it's the author's more or less constrained intention or the public features available to the interpreter which constitute the work's meaning may be set to rest, the conflicting positions being merely two options on a par.

In this talk I'll explore the implications of this model for the issue of pluralism concerning academic interpretations of works of art. Pluralists hold that interpretations are to be evaluated, not according to the reasonability of the perspective which supports them, but for their illuminating and interesting effects only. They may have internal validity in the form of consistency with interpreters' aims, but external validity is excluded.

From the viewpoint of the interactional model, the pluralist stance, in so far as it doesn't privilege S's intended meaning and the most reasonable interpretation aims at external validity, corresponds to the option of imagined meaning. If so, it's on a par with performative interpretation. As such, it may testify to the richness of the artwork, but makes less sense as an academic enterprise.

Responsibility and Reasonable Expectations

Marianna Leventi
Lund University

ABSTRACT
Many examples show how people in different civilizations and cultures view life from distinct perspectives. In ancient Rome, for instance, watching people fight to the death was an entirely acceptable practice. It was part of who they were, as citizens, and part of the way they have learned that they should behave. People attended the fights and enjoyed them. After all, the gladiators are criminals, enslaved people, and outcasts, and they probably deserve what is coming (Elliott, 2017). However, this view is not usually shared by most contemporary societies. We do not believe it is entertaining to watch people killing each other in an arena. We are appalled, and we cannot understand how those people accepted this custom. As people who presumably know better, should we blame those ancient citizens for their wrong behavior because they should have known the wrongness of their actions? Or ought we attribute their behavior to ignorance and excuse them because they did not know any better? Rosen (2004) suggests that people can be blameworthy only for actions they knowingly committed. According to Rosen, these actions are very hard or impossible to find. Thus, we can not make "confident, positive attributions of responsibility" (p. 295). This skeptic argument sparked a debate in the responsibility debate. Fitzpatrick (2008) used the account of reasonable expectations in order to respond to the skeptical argument. However, many authors have been interpreting the concept of reasonable expectations differently.

In this presentation, I will conclude that reasonable expectations cannot respond to the skeptic argument and suggest reasons to find agents like the Roman citizens blameworthy, regardless of reasonable expectations. Such reasons are victims' perspective and welfare, and the morality's own goal to create a better society.

Russellian Monism and the Unknowability of Quiddities

Olle Stig Kristoffer Lövgren
Stockholm University

ABSTRACT

Russellian monism is a theory of consciousness according to which "quiddities," the categorical bases of basic physical dispositions, ground macrophenomenal properties. The view comes in two varieties: panpsychism, according to which quiddities are microphenomenal properties, and panprotopsychism, according to which they are protophenomenal properties. In this paper, I argue that quiddities are unknowable, i.e., that even if Russellian monism is true, no truths about quiddities could be known. I argue for this conclusion in two steps. First, I show that the knowability of quiddities is consistent with panpsychism, but not with panprotopsychism. Consequently, quiddities are knowable only if we know that panpsychism is true. Second, I make the case that no evidence favours panpsychism over panprotopsychism. It follows that quiddities are unknowable. I conclude that the unknowability of quiddities undermines the comparative explanatory attractiveness of Russellian monism viz-a-viz materialist and dualist theories of consciousness.

The Problem of Social AIs

Björn Lundgren
Utrecht University

ABSTRACT

Recently, Barbro Fröding and Martin Peterson (Friendly AI, 2020, Philosophy & Technology) argued that "one of the most important features of near-future AIs" will be "their capacity to behave in a friendly manner to humans" (p. 1, published without page count).

The question they address is the question of how social AIs should be programmed to behave: friendly, "as opposed to mean, hostile or unfriendly in other ways unfriendly" (p. 2). They take it to be uncontroversial that AIs should be friendly and that the question is how we ought to understand this claim. In this talk, I content that it is not uncontroversial and that it infact rests on a false dichotomy between friendly and unfriendly social behavior. More importantly, I will argue that we have pro tanto reasons to minimize the occurrences of social interactions between human and AIs. Moreover, when social interaction is warranted (i.e., when the pro tanto proviso is overridden), the prima facie standard ought to be that AIs should be professional rather than friendly.

The former claim will defended on basis of the risks involved in big data collection relative to individuals' privacy, ability to be anonymous, and their autonomy. The former claim will limit the situation in which social AIs are appropriate.

This latter claim will require a closer analysis of the claims of Fröding and Peterson; briefly put "that AIs should be programmed to behave in a manner that mimics a sufficient number of aspects of proper friendship" (p. 7). Argument against this idea will again rest on autonomy arguments, for example, relating to the risks of humans being manipulated by AI-systems mimicking of real emotional expressions.

Discussing the Ontology of Rock Music

Hugo Luzio
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ABSTRACT

Ontologists of music have focused their discussions on examples of musical works and performances that belong almost uniquely to the tradition of Western classical music. Classical works are typically categorized as pieces for live performance. Just as classical works from different historical periods may be ontologically diverse, however, so may works from different non-Classical or non-Western musical traditions. In this talk, I discuss the three main ontological accounts of rock music. The recording-centered account (Gracyk 1996, Fisher 1998, Kania 2006) holds that rock works are not thin sound-structures (i.e., songs) to be instanced in performances, but thick sound-structures encoded on recordings and instanced through playbacks of their copies in appropriate devices. The studio-performance account (Davies 2001) claims that rock works are not for playback, but for performance. However, whereas classical works are for live performance, rock works are for studio performance. Finally, the song-centered account (Bruno 2013) claims, quite simply, that rock works are songs.

After presenting some of the characteristic differences between classical and rock recordings, I argue that the recording-centered account has unreasonable consequences towards the status of unrecorded (rock) songs, covers, remixes and remasters. Then, I argue that the studio-performance account has unreasonable consequences towards the role of producers and sound-engineers and the status of live-performances of songs that imitate studio-performances by using the studio-technology that was involved in their recording-process. I conclude by arguing that a song-centered account is able to accommodate the distinctive importance of recording and performative practices in rock music. A sketch of this view is provided and defended.

Can We Ascribe Capabilities to Species and Ecosystems? A Critique of Ecocentric Versions of the Capabilities Approach

Anders Melin
Malmö University

ABSTRACT
The Capabilities Approach put forward by Martha Nussbaum is currently one of the most influential theories of justice. Originally, Nussbaum only applied it to humans, but in later works she argues that also sentient animals should be ascribed capabilities. Contrary to Nussbaum herself, some scholars want to extend the Capabilities Approach even further and suggest that also collective entities should be ascribed capabilities.

This paper presents a critique of their extension of the Capabilities Approach and argues that ascribing capabilities to collective entities conflicts with the framework of political liberalism, which is the starting-point for the Capabilities Approach, especially if we assume that they should be regarded as subjects of justice. First, by assuming that species and ecosystems have capabilities, we presuppose the controversial standpoint that they are objectively existing entities. Second, the mentioned scholars justify ascribing capabilities to species and ecosystems by claiming that they have agency and integrity, but we need to recognize that they have these characteristics in a radically different sense than humans. Third, the view that species and ecosystems are subjects of justice requires the controversial assumption that they have interests of their own.

Decision Rules for Imprecise Lockeans

Hana Möller Kalpak
Stockholm University

ABSTRACT
According to the Lockean thesis, rational belief corresponds to rational credence above a certain threshold. A version of the Lockean thesis can be derived from the assumption that a rational agent maximizes the expected accuracy of her beliefs, given her credences (Hempel 1962, Easwaran 2016, Dorst 2019).This talk presents parts of work aimed at generalizing this version of the Lockean thesis to cases where rational credences are imprecise, in the sense of being given by a set of (probability) functions (overview: Bradley, 2019). In these cases, beliefs are not guaranteed the type of precise expectation values required for a maximization-based decision rule to be applicable.

Instead, beliefs but must be deemed rational on the grounds of conforming to some more general decision rule, applicable also to cases where expectation values are imprecise. In the talk, I formulate some basic desiderata for imprecise epistemic decision rules, and use these in an assessment of two well-known rules from practical imprecise decision theory: E-admissbility (Levi 1980) and Gamma-maximin (Gilboa & Schmeidler 1989). I show that neither rule satisfies these desiderata: for instance, neither guarantees that an agent's rational belief in some proposition p persists as long as her credence in p remains unchanged. I will also consider the prospects of using an aggregative decision rule to ground the Lockean thesis, after showing why such a rule makes sense for specifically epistemic decision problems, despite failing to generalize to other types of imprecise choice.

A Logical Account of Erotetic Ignorance

Karl Nygren
Stockholm University

ABSTRACT
Just as one can be ignorant of a fact, one can be ignorant of the answers to a question. For example, one can be ignorant of the answer to the question of whether it is raining outside, one can be ignorant of the answer to the question of who the current prime minster of Sweden is, or one can be ignorant of the answer to the question of where to buy a pair of shoes in Stockholm. This type of ignorance is sometimes known as erotetic ignorance. While there are logical approaches to ignorance of facts, a logical account of erotetic ignorance is still missing.

In this talk, I present such an account based on the framework of inquisitive semantics, which is a semantic framework in which logical relationships between both statements and questions can be captured. I propose formal definitions of erotetic ignorance, and discuss the modal inquisitive logics that these notions naturally give rise to.

Not-So-Trivial Moral Luck

Anna Nyman
Uppsala University

ABSTRACT
On a common characterization, moral luck occurs when factors beyond agents' control affect their moral blame- or praiseworthiness. The existence of moral luck is widely contested, however. In this talk, I will present a challenge for deniers of moral luck. It seems that some factors beyond agents' control, such as moral principles about blame- and praiseworthiness, clearly affect agents' blame- or praiseworthiness. Thus, moral luck deniers face a dialectical burden that has so far gone unnoticed, namely, to provide a relevant difference between the factors beyond agents' control they deny give rise to moral luck and the factors that do give rise to it. I argue that no obvious way to meet the challenge presents itself and that it thus amounts to a serious worry for deniers of moral luck.

Local Fictionalism and the Birth of Jesus

Carl-Johan Palmqvist
Lund University

ABSTRACT

Religious fictionalism is a belief-less approach to religion which treats religious language as fiction and religious life as a game of make-believe (Eshleman 2005; Le Podevin 2019). It is standardly treated as a global approach to religion, meaning that a fictionalist is understood to interpret the complete religious discourse as fiction. By contrast, I will consider the idea of a local fictionalism limited to specific parts of a religious tradition.

Most religious traditions contain parts which are almost certainly literally false. Consider the biblical narrative of Jesus's birth. We know that it cannot be historically correct since the details do not add up: Herod the great died several years before the roman census, no large-scale massacre of infants took place, a roman census did not require people to return to their places of origin etc. I argue that local fictionalism is the best way to handle such problematic aspects of a tradition.

Religious non-doxasticism is a contrasting belief-less approach which substitutes belief with weaker attitudes such as acceptance or assumption (Alston 1996; Howard-Snyder 2017). Unlike fictionalism, it requires that religious truth remains an epistemic possibility. It is unclear how the non-doxasticist should handle cases like the birth narrative of Jesus. Can one commit non-doxastically to a religious tradition which contains obviously false parts? I argue that global non-doxasticism needs to be combined with local fictionalism to handle such cases.

There are several well-known problems facing religious fictionalism. It is often questioned how fiction alone can motivate a religious life, or how the fictionalist can practice her religion without deceiving the religious community. I have even argued that fictionalism might lead to mental health issues (Palmqvist submitted manuscript). However, I will show how these problems only affect global fictionalism, and that they should not keep us from employing the approach locally.

Distribution of Responsibility for Climate Change Adaptation - Is the Global Discussion Relevant on the Local and Regional Level?

Erik Persson, Lund University
Kerstin Eriksson, RISE Research Institutes of Sweden
Åsa Knaggård, Lund University

ABSTRACT
How to distribute responsibility for climate change adaptation is an increasingly important issue locally and regionally as well as globally.

Responsibility is a concept that is very much in focus in discussions about climate change ethics on the global level. In international negotiations about climate change mitigation, the hardest negotiations tend to focus, not on whether climate change is real or human caused, but on how much different countries should cut down their emissions and which countries should compensate which other countries to what extent.

Most academic discussions regarding distribution of responsibilities in connection with climate change have in accordance dealt with climate change mitigation and adaptation on the global level. There is a stark need to extend the discussion to also include the local and regional levels.

Regional and municipal planning processes have resulted in conflicts over what public authorities as well as other actors, including the private sectors and individuals should do to protect society against the negative impacts of climate change. Climate adaptation cannot only be seen as a planning issue that needs efficient solutions, as is often the case today. Such an approach will lead to higher levels of societal conflict over climate adaptation and low levels of legitimacy for climate adaptation measures. The decisions need to be ethically acceptable as well as accepted as just by those affected.

Considering, however, how much has been said about the distribution of responsibilities on the global level, we find it rational to start the discussion about the local level by asking if and how these discussions can inform the question of how to distribute the responsibility for climate change adaptation on the local and regional level.

On the Legal Notion of Arbitrariness

Elena Prats
Uppsala University

ABSTRACT
Arbitrariness is explicitly forbidden in some constitutions, such as the Spanish or the Swiss, and contrary to the Rule of Law. In academia, it is not uncommon to witness characterizations of legal phenomena – particularly in the field of migration and citizenship studies- as arbitrary in a moral sense, and condemning it using legal arguments. It is, thus, not uncommon among some scholars to use interchangeably the notions of moral and legal arbitrariness as if they were the same. The best attempt to distinguish and disentangle the moral and legal notions of arbitrariness so far is probably the one done by Patricia Mindus in her article Towards a Theory of Arbitrary Law-making in Migration Policy, published in 2020 at the journal Etikk I Praksis- Nordic Journal of Applied Ethics. Although Mindus brilliantly distinguishes among the moral and legal notions of arbitrariness, providing a new and illuminating understanding of their differences, some criticisms can be presented against her view on legal arbitrariness. Mainly, against her idea on that there are three differentiated notions of arbitrariness in the law. In my talk, I aim at presenting my paper published in 2021 at the journal CEFD presenting criticisms against Mindus view, particularly against the idea that there are three notions of arbitrariness in the law. In my presentation, I will provide arguments defending the position that there is only one valid way of understanding legal arbitrariness.

Metaphysically Heavyweight, Normatively Lightweight: A Defense of Non-Ardent Non-Naturalism

Olle Risberg
Uppsala University

ABSTRACT

I aim to formulate and defend a metaethical position that has not yet received much direct attention. I call it non-ardent non-naturalism. The view is non-naturalist in that it posits moral facts which differ in kind from those studied by the sciences; it is non-ardent in that it denies that "reality itself favors certain ways [of] acting" (Eklund 2017). It can be formulated as follows:

NN1: There are (atomic) moral facts;

NN2: Moral facts differ in kind from those studied by the sciences;

NN3: Moral judgments aim to represent moral facts;

NN4: Moral facts are not "ontologically lightweight"—they do not exist only in a "non-ontological sense", as Parfit (2011) puts it;

NN5: Moral facts are nonetheless not "authoritatively prescriptive"—it is not the case that "reality itself favors certain ways [of] acting".

My argument for this view is cumulative: On the whole, it accommodates some central metaethical intuitions and insights better than competing views. The four main ones are:

(i) The Moorean intuition: Certain things, such as torturing babies for fun, are wrong (and thus error theory, which denies NN1, are false).

(ii) The Just-Too-Different intuition: Moral facts are just too different from natural facts to be identical with them (and thus naturalism, which denies NN2, is false).

(iii) The Frege-Geach insight: Moral language and thought behaves too much like descriptive language and thought to be non-descriptive (and thus non-cognitivism, which denies NN3, is false).

(iv) The Mackiean intuition: Authoritative prescriptivity is metaphysically queer (and thus ardent realism, which denies NN5, is false).

While none of these considerations are decisive by themselves, they together provide strong support for non-ardent non-naturalism. I will end by considering some substantive implications of this view, concerning, e.g., the deliberative role and significance of moral knowledge, and of normative knowledge more generally.

The Paradox of Pluralism and Universalism: Joseph de Maistre's Critique of the Enlightenment

Marianne Sandelin
University of Helsinki

ABSTRACT

In this presentation, I will talk about pluralism and universalism from the perspective of Joseph de Maistre (1753–1821). Although Maistre has been portrayed as the forefather of European conservatism and as one of the most anti-modern critics of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution, his thought contained some rather unpredictable and more modern aspects as well. Maistre was one of the first thinkers to observe those contradictions within the Enlightenment, of which it has been accused from a variety of directions from 20th century onwards. I argue that Maistre foresaw strikingly far ahead the enormous tension within the Enlightenment, at the heart of which was the paradoxical nature of universalism and the question of pluralism. On one hand, it was liberal, pluralistic, tolerant and preaching for the equality, liberty and happiness of all people. On the other, the very universalism that held that all people are the same and thus equal due to the universal reason that separates humans from animals, would inevitably lead into a monistic worldview, intolerant of any kind of diversity and arrogantly telling people and other cultures from above, how to live their lives, organize their societies and institutions or what to believe in. Maistre saw the Enlightenment as an arrogant and dangerous hypocrite that spoke in the name of general good, while trying to coerce its own monistic world view and outlooks on others. When seeking to oppose the Enlightenment and its universalism with all possible means, Maistre came to provide an effective intellectual defense of pluralism of cultures.

By looking at Maistre's critique of the Enlightenment, we might also find a more nuanced understanding of the crisis of liberalism and the reasons leading to the current rise of illiberal political movements aspiring to harness the masses against the liberal ideals of the Enlightenment.

Pascalian Muggings - Longtermism and the Problem of Fanaticism

Signe Savén
Lund University

ABSTRACT
Pascal's mugging (Bostrom, 2009), illustrates a counter intuitive implication of holding that expected value maximization is the right decision-method for decision-making under risk no matter the circumstances. The text lays out how Pascal loses his wallet to a mugger, not by the threat of violence, but by careful reasoning in accordance with expected value theory. Pascal willingly gives his wallet to the mugger, because the mugger promises to give him quadrillions of extra happy days in return, and though Pascal believes that the probability of the mugger delivering on this promise is close to zero, it is still sufficient to render the expected value of giving up his wallet higher than the expected value of keeping it. Roughly, longtermism holds that in (at least) some cases, what we ought to do is determined by the expected long-term effects of our actions. A difficult problem for longtermists is that the further into the future we look, the more difficult it is to predict the consequences of our actions. Some options seem extremely unlikely to pay off, but if they do, the payoff is enormous. In here lies the similarity to Pascal's case.

Many would judge Pascal to act contrary to reason in giving up his wallet. Remaining committed to maximize expected value, even though the probability involved is tiny, seems rather fanatical. Does the similarities between Pascal's case and that which many longtermists face imply that longtermists are open to the same line of criticism as Pascal? Is it contrary to reason to spend resources on trying to improve the long-term future when the probability of success is tiny, but the potential payoff is enormous? These questions form the basis from which my talk departs.

A Dilemma for the Scientific Believer

Jan Scheffel
KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm

ABSTRACT
By definition the universe contains all that exists in space and time. The ambition in science is to systematically deal with what can be found in nature. By placing all of nature's ontology and functionality within science, a monistic view can be declared. This view is however not shared by everybody; believers are dualistic or pluralistic in that they assume the existence of one or more additional realms that cannot be reduced to each other. We will discuss to what extent an intervening god is consistent with the scientific view from a new perspective. The argument rests on a recently developed theory implying that human consciousness features an emergent complexity that defies both third person understanding and control of it. In this theory, mental processes of consciousness are found to be irreducible to the low-level neural networks on which they supervene.

Thus they cannot be interpreted or communicated with meaningfully at the neural network level. Not even a deity with access to the informational and computational powers of the physical universe would be able to pass the barrier that separates physical interaction at neural low-level with high-level mental activity. Direct communication between the deity and the mental does not seem possible. This perspective presents a dilemma for the scientific believer.

Veritism and Ways of Deriving Epistemic Value

Ylwa Sjölin Wirling
University of Gothenburg & University of Manchester

ABSTRACT
Veritists hold that only truth has fundamental epistemic value. They are committed to explaining all other instances of epistemic goodness as somehow deriving their value through a relation to truth, and in order to do so they arguably need a non-instrumental relation of epistemic value derivation. As is currently common in epistemology, many veritists assume that the epistemic is an insulated evaluative domain: claims about what has epistemic value is independent of claims about what has value *simpliciter.* This paper argues that the insulation approach to epistemic value is incompatible with non-instrumental epistemic value derivation. Veritsts who want to avail themselves of this important explanatory resource should therefore abandon the insulation approach.

Tib+Tail Can Lose Her Tail

Jeroen Smid
University of Amsterdam

ABSTRACT

Standard definitions of 'mereological fusion' are quiet about modality (van Inwagen 2016). Yet, especially in the context of classical mereology, many hold that fusions have their parts necessarily (Baker 2008, p. 17; Jago 2021, p. 1442; Koslicki 2008, p. 24; Simon 1987, p. 115; Uzquiano 2014). In this talk I identify three reasons for this view and argue that they are all bad reasons.

The first is that classical mereology creates a tight link between identity and composition (Uzquiano 2014). Since identity holds necessarily, being a fusion of such-and-such objects should also hold necessarily. This argument fails because identity is subject to Leibniz's Law whereas not everything that is true of a fusion of objects is true of the objects it fuses.

The second reason is that classical mereology is similar to set theory (Jago 2021, p. 1442ff). Sets seemingly have their members necessarily, so fusions have their parts necessarily too. This argument by analogy fails because, first, the nature of the two objects is different; and, second, classical mereology and set theory play different theoretical roles.

The final reason is that i is the only principled choice when it comes to deciding the modal profile of fusions. (Uzquiano 2014, p. 46). This is a false dilemma. It might be elegant, in some sense, to hold that all fusions have the same modal profile, but if wholes are fusions, then there is no reason to think that all fusions have the same modal profile because not all wholes have the same modal profile.

I finish by diagnosing the confusion about the modal status of mereological fusions as due to a confusion between the singular term 'Tib+Tail' and the plural term 'Tib and Tail'.

Needs and Moral Significance: The Transmission Principle

Espen Stabell
Norwegian University of Science and Technology

ABSTRACT

In ethics and political philosophy, appeals to need are commonly assessed in terms of the 'basicness' or intrinsic moral importance of needs. Showing that need N is 'basic' is to show that it is morally important to meet. However, many arguments from need do not refer to basic needs. For example, the claim that 'society needs petroleum' is not an appeal to a basic need. That, however, does not imply that the need cannot be morally important to meet. How should we assess such appeals to 'non-basic' needs? I develop an account of how a need can be morally significant – in the sense that there is moral reason to meet it, or at least not to frustrate it – regardless of whether it is 'basic' or have some other kind of intrinsic moral importance. What I call the Transmission Principle for Needs (TPN) implies that if a good Y is necessary for an agent X in order to achieve a morally significant end Z, then (at least some of) the moral significance of Z is transmitted to (providing X with) Y. Responding to central objections to TPN, I argue that the principle is crucial for understanding formal aspects of the morality and normativity of needs, and for evaluating arguments from need.

I illustrate with the cases of education and petroleum how TPN can be used to evaluate particular appeals to need in moral arguments. My discussion suggests that TPN is more fundamental to analysing and assessing arguments from need than the concept of basic needs.

De Se Thoughts and Modes of Presentation

Andreas Stokke
Uppsala University

ABSTRACT
A long and well-established tradition in philosophy holds that there is a special category of de se thoughts, also known as indexical, egocentric, or first-person thoughts. One central thesis in this tradition is the view that de se thoughts mandate a departure from orthodox accounts of attitudes. This thesis has been challenged by a number of philosophers. According to such anti-exceptionalists the de se phenomena demand no more of our theories of attitudes than traditional Frege cases.

In particular, this anti-exceptionalist view holds that the de se can be accounted for within a theory of attitudes that satisfies three constraints. First, attitudes are two-place relations between subjects and contents. Second, contents are assigned so as to honor Frege's Constraint, according to which if a subject can rationally have a belief she could express by "S" without having a belief she could express by "S'", the two beliefs are distinct. Third, contents vary in truth value only with worlds. The traditional way of meeting Frege's Constraint is by appeal to modes of presentation (MOPs).

As such, one kind of anti-exceptionalist holds that the de se can be accounted for by MOPs in the same way that MOPs can account for how it can be rational to believe, for instance, "Hesperus is shining" while also believing "Phosphorus is shining." Yet few, if any, anti-exceptionalists have attempted to spell out a category of de se MOPs that to suit this purpose. This paper first formulates some conditions that de se MOPs must have in order to do the explanatory work that anti-exceptionalists require of them. Second, it evaluates whether such MOPs are sufficient for explaining the de se.

Thomas Aquinas on Truthfulness, Character, and What We Owe Each Other

Alexander Stöpfgeshoff
Stockholm University

ABSTRACT
A trait that is often associated with a good person is caring about the truth. Someone who cares about the truth tells the truth even when doing so is uncomfortable or dangerous and does not lie to gain an unfair advantage. Contemporary approaches to the role of truth for a virtuous person posit a virtue that is about all truths and or sees truth-telling as part of a general virtue of honesty. In contrast to this approach stands Thomas Aquinas's discussion of what he calls the virtue of truthfulness. However, Aquinas does not conceive of this virtue as being about truth in all situations. While Aquinas's account of this virtue hasreceived some attention (White 1993; Flannery 2013), the reason why Aquinas thinks truthfulness is so narrowly defined is unexplored.

A general consideration of Aquinas's theory of virtue reveals that his restricted view of truthfulness is not arbitrary but a consequence of broader commitments and that he presents a worthwhile and distinct approach to the role of truth in being a good person from current approaches.

Difference-Making Mental Causation Does Not Save Free Will

Alva Stråge
Unaffiliated

ABSTRACT
According to the Exclusion Argument (see e.g., Kim, J. 1989;1992; 2000), mental states are excluded as causes of actions if non-reductive physicalism is true. The reason is roughly that any physical effect has a sufficient physical cause. List & Menzies (2017) argue that the Exclusion argument presuppose what is known as production causation, but that mental causation should be understood in terms of difference-making causation. According to List & Menzies, a difference-making account of mental causation not only solves the problem of causal exclusion but also saves free will. More precisely, they argue that it rebuts what they call 'the Neurosceptical Argument', the argument that if actions are caused by neural states and processes unavailable to us, there is no free will. The aim of this talk is to critically discuss List & Menzies' proposed solution to the Exclusion Problem and how it works against the Neurosceptical Argument.

I will argue that there are two problems with their account. First, I will argue that they fail to show that mental states are sufficiently autonomous from their realizers for it to be the case that mental causation gives room for free will in a way that physical causation does not. Second, the first argument disregarded, it seems that the difference-making analysis is open not only to mental states but to physical states as well. If this is correct, the mental and physical tokens (i.e., the mental and the physical difference-makers) are co-extensive across all possible worlds, which make them both difference-makers of the same effect. Then, we are again facing the problem of overdetermination, since we have two difference-making causes to the same effect. I conclude that the difference-making account of mental causation does not defeat the Exclusion Argument, nor the Neurosceptical Argument, in a way that saves free will.

Causal Interventionism for Everyone

Henning Strandin
Stockholm University

ABSTRACT
James Woodward presented his interventionist theory of causation as a "semantic project" in Making Things Happen (2003), and it is still common to regard the theory as providing the content of certain causal concepts. Woodward has emphasized two other characteristics of the theory: non-reductionism and, most of all, its usefulness for causal reasoning. In this talk I argue that the semantic project does not succeed, as the theory is currently formulated, and that it is unlikely that it could succeed without violating major desiderata of the interventionist approach.

However, I also argue that--contrary to first impressions--the usefulness of the theory is not dependent on the success of the semantic project. I introduce a distinction between semantic interventionism and heuristic interventionism.

I give examples of how philosophers have used interventionism for their arguments, and show how heuristic interventionism suffices for these uses. I argue that this interpretation of interventionism contributes to the clarity of the theory, especially as regards its non-reductionist aspect. Furthermore, as interventionism's independence from most issues in causal metaphysics is made explicit, the interventionist approach becomes available and potentially useful to more philosophers. However, because heuristic interventionism is not a theory of causation in the traditional sense, it also requires us to think of and describe the theory in new ways. Finally, I explain how I think heuristic interventionism is in fact a theory exactly in Woodward's spirit.

Health as a Natural Property, Not a Natural Kind

Amanda Thorell
Stockholm University

ABSTRACT
The philosophical debate about health and pathology is commonly portrayed as harboring two opposite views – naturalism and normativism. Typically, normativism is taken to understand 'health' and 'pathology' as value-laden concepts that pick out properties dependent on human ideas and values. Naturalism, in contrast, is typically taken to understand 'health' and 'pathology' as value-free concepts that pick out natural kinds.

The claim that health and pathology are natural kinds means that they are properties that exist independently of human ideas and values. But it also means something stronger: that health and pathology are categories that are basic or of special importance from an objective point of view – categories in nature that objectively "light up".

However, the assumption that naturalism must consider health and pathology to be natural kinds has never been explicitly discussed. Rather, it has been implicitly taken for granted. This is remarkable, since much criticism directed towards naturalistic theories are based on this assumption. Also, the plausibility of succeeding with the naturalistic endeavor may hinge on whether the goal is to account for health and pathology as natural kinds or whether the goal is something else.

I will argue that a naturalistic view need not consider health and pathology to be natural kinds. Rather, a naturalistic view merely needs to consider health and pathology to be natural properties, i.e. properties that exist independently of human ideas and values, but – in contrast to natural kinds – need not be objectively basic.

Believing in a Conspiracy Theory – Is it Rational?

Melina Tsapos
Lund University

ABSTRACT

The supposed rationality of conspiratorial belief – a hotly debated issue – divides philosophers into mainly two camps. The particularists believe that each conspiracy theory (CT) ought to be examined on its own merits. After all, conspiracies are unraveled every day and every historian would agree that history is full of secretive plots, political and otherwise. The generalists, by contrast, argues that there is something inherently suspect about CTs that makes belief in them "mad, bad, and dangerous" (Pigden, 2018).

Recent empirical findings indicate that conspiratorial thinking is commonplace among ordinary people, arising as a "natural byproduct of political reasoning under uncertainty, as people […] cope with structural forces outside their control" (Radnitz & Underwood, 2015). Being less easily accommodated by the generalist, such findings have naturally shifted attention to the particularist.Yet, even the particularist must agree that not all conspiracy belief is rational, in which case she must explain what separates rational from non-rational conspiratorial thinking. In my presentation, I contrast three strategies to this end: 1) the probabilistic objectivist (Grimes, 2016) which assesses the objective probability of conspiracies; 2) the subjectivist, who rather focuses on the perspective of the believer, and typically views the decision to believe in a conspiracy as a problem of decision making under risk (Doyle, to appear). Approaches 1) and 2) rely on assessments of the probability of conspiracy which, I argue, limits their applicability.

Instead, I explore 3) viewing the problem facing the potential believer as a decision problem under uncertainty (about probabilities). I argue that focusing solely on epistemic utilities fails to do justice to the particular character of conspiracy beliefs, which are not exclusively epistemically motivated, and investigate the rationality of non-epistemic utilities under a number of decision rules.

Higer-level Causes and Freaky Realizations

Bram Vaassen
Umeå University

ABSTRACT
Building on observations by Fodor (1974, 1991), Schiffer (1991), and Hoefer (2004), Fenton-Glynn (2017) has recently argued that the possibility of thermodynamically abnormal realizations speaks in favour of probability-raising accounts of causation. Such 'freaky' realizations suggest that the main competitors of probability-raising accounts cannot allow for higher-level causes such as infections and hurricanes. By contrast, probability-raising accounts appear to have no problems allowing higher-level causation in the face of freaky realizations. In this talk, I push back against Fenton-Glynn's case for probability-raising accounts and argue that sufficiency accounts (e.g., Mackie 1974, Bennett 2017, Vivhelin and Tomkow ms), counterfactual accounts (e.g., Lewis 1973, Loewer 2007, Albert 2015), and interventionist accounts (e.g., Woodward 2003) can all allow for higher-level causation in the face of freaky realizations. Contrary to appearances, such case will do little to help us decide between any of these accounts and a probability-raising view.

The Precautionary Principle: Explicated and Vindicated

Timothy Williamson, University of Oxford
Christopher Bottomley, Australian Public Service

ABSTRACT
The Precautionary Principle tells us that if some act might result in serious harm, then it should be replaced by one that minimizes the chance of serious harm. Though highly influential and underwritten by strong moral intuitions, this principle must be spelled out more precisely if it is to serve as an action-guiding tool: what kinds of thing count as serious harms, and what costs are we required to bear to minimize their chances? One popular approach is to adopt Risk-Weighted Expected Utility Theory (REU) and argue that the Precautionary Principle follows from obeying that decision theory (e.g., Bargiacchi 2003, Quiggin 2005, Buchak 2019).

Our first goal is to argue that this approach is misguided. We present a case in which REU recommends extreme caution though no decision you might make gives rise to a chance of serious harm. This shows that REU fails to capture the core intuition behind the Precautionary Principle; moreover, REU requires us to bear the significant costs associated with caution in more cases than does the Precautionary Principle. We diagnose the issue as stemming from a structural problem with REU: it is stakes-insensitive, meaning that it requires your risk-attitudes to be insensitive to the magnitude of the losses you might face (cf. Armendt 2014, Stefánsson and Bradley 2019, Hájek forthcoming).

Our second goal is to outline and defend an improved interpretation of the Precautionary Principle. We draw on Weighted Linear Utility Theory (Chew 1983) and argue that (i) this view can be re-interpreted along normative lines to provide an alternative to REU, and (ii) the resulting view vindicates the core intuitions behind the Precautionary Principle. So, not only can we vindicate the Precautionary Principle, doing so pushes us towards a novel normative decision theory with significant advantages over existing theories.

PROGRAM

Day 1 (Friday, June 10th)

11:30-13:00	Registration LUX Foyer						
13:00-13:30	Welcome speech The Mayor of the City of Lund, Mats Helmfrid Erik J Olsson and Björn Petersson LUX Aula						
13:30-14:25	Keynote Hilary Greaves Chair: Björn Petersson LUX Aula						
Friday, June 10	**Room B237**	**Room B336**	**Room B251**	**Room B152**	**Room C126**	**Room C121**	**Room C214**
14:40-15:20	**Erik Persson, Kerstin Eriksson, Åsa Knaggård**, *Distribution of responsibility for climate change adaptation - Is the global discussion relevant on the local and regional level?* Chair: Anton Emilsson	Workshop "Social Responsibility" **Marta Johansson Werkmäster**, *Proportionality and Blame* Chair: Mattias Gunnemyr	**Melina Tsapos**, *Believing in a Conspiracy Theory - Is It Rational?* Chair: Niklas Dahl	**Andreas Stokke**, De se *thoughts and modes of presentation* Chair: Martin Jönsson	**Amanda Thorell**, *Health as a Natural Property, Not a Natural Kind* Chair: Tobias Hansson Wahlberg	**Karsten Klint Jensen**, *The Problem of Domain in Population Axiology* Chair: Fritz-Anton Fritzson	
15:20-15:40	COFFEE						

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Friday cont.	Room B237	Room B336	Room B251	Room B152	Room C126	Room C121	Room C214
15:40-16:20	Invited speaker (Applied Ethics) **Christian Munthe**, *The Role of Pragmatics in Practical Ethics* Chair: Jakob Stenseke	Workshop "Social Responsibility" **Andrés Garcia**, *The unfairness of blaming collectives* Chair: Jakob Werkmäster		**Niklas Dahl**, *Knowing who and knowing how: understanding, reference, and aboutness* Chair: Martin Jönsson	Invited speaker (Metaphysics) **Anna-Sofia Maurin**, *The Anatomy of Metaphysical Explanation* Chair: Robin Stenwall		
16:30-17:10	Invited speaker (Philosophy of Language) **Anandi Hattiangadi (with Corine Besson)**, *Deductive Reasoning Without Rule Following* Chair: Martin Jönsson	Workshop "Social Responsibility" **Mattias Gunnemyr**, *Manipulation in Context* Chair: Hadi Fazeli	Invited speaker (Philosophy and Society) **Åsa Wikforss** *Knowledge Resistance and the Politization of Facts* Chair: Niklas Dahl		**Bram Vaassen**, *Higher-Level Causes and Freaky Realizations* Chair: Tobias Hansson Wahlberg	**Henrik Andersson**, *The possibility of incomparability* Chair: Jenny Magnusson	**Arvid Båve**, *The truth conditions of structured propositions* Chair: Robin Stenwall
17:20-18:00	**Martin Kaså**, *Open texture: characterization and some implications* Chair: Martin Jönsson	Workshop "Social Responsibility" **Jakob Werkmäster**, *Relational Blameworthiness* Chair: Andréas Garcia					

Day 2 (Saturday, June 11th)

	Room B237	Room B336	Room B251	Room B152	Room C126	Room C121	Room C214
9:15-9:55		Workshop "Blame: Perspectives and Moral Expectations" **Alexander Velichkov,** *Psychopathy, Fairness, and Ambivalence* Chair: Yuliya Kanygina	**Jiwon Kim,** *How Not to Ground Moral Principles on Indeterminacy* Chair: Marianna Leventi	**Timothy Williamson & Christopher Bottomley,** *The Precautionary Principle: Explicated and Vindicated* Chair: Olle Blomberg	**Axel Ekström, Jens Nirme and Peter Gärdenfors,** *The bouba/kiki effect and the gesture theory of language evolution: mapping movement to prosody* Chair: Martin Sjöberg	Paul de Font-Reaulx, *Penelope and the Drinks* Chair: Jakob Werkmäster	Olle Risberg, *Metaphysically Heavyweight, Normatively Lightweight: A Defense of Non-Ardent Non-Naturalism* Chair: Mattias Gunnemyr
10:05-10:45	Invited speaker (Ethics) **Krister Bykvist,** *Value magnitudes revisited* Chair: Fritz-Anton Fritzson	Workshop **Shervin MirzaeiGhazi,** *A Problem of Incompatibilism* Chair: Robert Pál-Wallin	Invited speaker (Epistemology) **Kathrin Glüer-Pagin,** *Motivated Reasoning and Rationality* Chair: Andreas Stephens	Invited speaker (Value theory) **Karsten Klint Jensen,** *Revisiting Regan and the Duty to Co-operate* Chair: Hadi Fazeli	**Hubert Hågemark,** *What we mean as what we said or would have said* Chair: Martin Jönsson		**Will Gamester and Graham Bex-Priestley,** *Side-Stepping the Frege-Geach Problem* Chair: Henrik Andersson

Saturday cont.	Room B237	Room B336	Room B251	Room B152	Room C126	Room C121	Room C214
10:55-11:35	**Anders Herlitz,** *Fixing person-based stakes in distributive theory* Chair: Olle Blomberg	Workshop **Yuliya Kanygina,** *Responsibility and Third-Party Blame* Chair: Alexander Velichkov	**Samuel Carlsson Tjernström,** *A dispositional solution of opacity* Chair: Max Minden Ribeiro	**Per Algander,** *Meaningful choices in a fatalistic world* Chair: Jenny Magnusson	**Felix Larsson,** *Vad är en (il)lokut handling?* Chair: Martin Jönsson	**Espen Stabell,** *Needs and Moral Significance: The Transmission Principle* Chair: Marianna Leventi	**Stina Björkholm,** *Dynamic Descriptivism and Moral Disagreement* Chair: Henrik Andersson
11:35-13:00	**LUNCH**						
13:00-13:55	**Keynote and Theoria Lecture** **Christian List, "***Agential Indeterminism***"** **Chair: Erik J Olsson** **LUX Aula**						
13:55-14:20	**THEORIA RECEPTION**						
14:25-15:05	**Meradjuddin Khan Oidermaa,** *On the plausibility of structural complicity* Chair: Jakob Werkmäster	Workshop **Anton Emilsson,** *Hope for Blame: The Victim's Perspective and the Participant Stance* Chair: Shervin MirzaeiGhazi	Invited speaker (Philosophy of Mind) **Pär Sundström,** *On nativism and empiricism about colour cognition* Chair: Max Minden Robeiro	**Björn Lundgren,** *The Problem of Social AIs* Chair: Frits Gåvertsson	**Hana Möller Kalpak,** *Decision rules for imprecise Lockeans* Chair: Melina Tsapos	**Karl Bergman,** *Rationality without transparency* Chair: Andreas Stephens	**Marvin Backes,** *On Inferential Moral Knowledge: A Defence of Hume's Law* Chair: Mattias Gunnemyr

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Saturday cont.	Room B237	Room B336	Room B251	Room B152	Room C126	Room C121	Room C214
15:10-15:50	Marcus Carlsen Häggrot, *De-Territorialised Legislatively Constituencies: A Conditional Defence* Chair: Fritz-Anton Fritzson	Workshop **Robert Pál-Wallin,** *Fitting Blame From the Perspective of the Blamer* Chair: Anton Emilsson	Olof Leffler, *Deference Incorporated* Chair: Jiwon Kim	Dimitri Coelho Mollo, *Modelling Intelligence: th Good, the Bad, and the Plural* Chair: Melina Tsapos	John Cantwell, *On the relationship between conditional probabilities and probabilities of conditionals* Chair: Martin Sjöberg	Alva Stråge, *Difference-making mental causation does not save free will* Chair: Max Minden Ribeiro	Anna Nyman, *Not-So-Trivial Moral Luck* Chair: Jenny Magnusson
16:00-16:40	Elena Prats, *On the Legal Notion of Arbitrariness* Chair: Hadi Fazeli	Invited speaker (Logic and Philosophy of Mathematics) **Øystein Linnebo,** *Potentialism in the philosophy and foundations of mathematics* Chair: Arvid Båve	Invited speaker (Metaethics) **Gunnar Björnsson,** *Instrumental reasons without difference-making* Chair: Robert Pál-Wallin	Invited speaker (Decision theory) **Erik Angner,** *Nudging as a Science of Design* Chair: Olle Blomberg	**Andrés Garcia and Henrik Andersson,** *Millianism generalised and interpreted* Chair: Anton Emilsson	**Thomas Kroedel,** *Interventionism, non-reductive physicalism, and causal model-building* Chair: Max Minden Ribeiro	
16:40-17:00	COFFEE						

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Saturday cont.	Room B237	Room B336	Room B251	Room B152	Room C126	Room C121	Room C214
17:00-17:40	Invited speaker (Philosophy of Law) **Christian Dahlman** *The Prison Riot Paradox* Chair: Erik J Olsson	**Karl Nygren,** *A logical account of erotetic ignorance* Chair: Arvid Båve	**Olle Blomberg,** *Being morally responsible for another's action* Chair: Shervin MirzaeiGhazi	Invited speaker (Philosophy of Cognition) **Peter Gärdenfors,** *Categories are determined by their invariances* Chair: Melina Tsapos		**Olle Lövgren,** *Russellian monism and the unknowability of quiddities* Chair: Max Minden Ribeiro	**Marianna Leventi,** *Responsibility and Reasonable Expectations* Chair: Jakob Wekmäster
19:00-22:00	**CONGRESS DINNER AT TEGNÉRS**						

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Day 3 (Sunday, June 12ᵗʰ)

Sunday June 12	Room B237	Room B336	Room B251	Room B152	Room C126	Room C121	Room C214
9:00-09:55	**Svenska filosofi-sällskapets annual meeting**	**Alexander Stöpfgeshoff,** *Thomas Aquinas on Truthfulness, Character, and What We Owe Each Other* Chair: Jakob Stenseke		**Palle Leth,** *Interactional interpretation and interpretive pluralism* Chair: Carl-Johan Palmqvist	**Sofia Bokros**, *The epistemic view on paradox* Chair: Arvid Båve	**Ragnar Francén**, *Disagreement for contextualists* Chair: Andreas Stephens	**Signe Savén,** *Pascalian Muggings - Longtermism and the problem of fanaticism* Chair: Anton Emilsson
10:00-10:40		**Marianne Sandelin,** *The Paradox of Pluralism and Universalism: Joseph de Maistre's Critique of the Enlightenment* Chair: Fritz-Anton Fritzson		**Hugo Luzio,** *Discussing the ontology of rock music* Chair: Carl-Johan Palmqvist	**Fredrik Engström**, *An alternative approach to dependence logic* Chair: Arvid Båve	**Ylwa Sjölin Wirling**, *Veritism and ways of deriving epistemic value* Chair: Andreas Stephens	**Andrea S. Asker,** *Posthumous Harm and Changing Desires: A Problem for Boonin* Chair: Yuliya Kanygina

Sunday cont.	Room B237	Room B336	Room B251	Room B152	Room C126	Room C121	Room C214
10:45-11:25	Invited speaker (Philosophy of Religion) **Carl-Reinhold Bråkenhielm,** *Livsmening och gudstro* Chair: Mattias Gunnemyr	**Anders Melin,** *Can We Ascribe Capabilities to Species and Ecosystems? A Critique of Ecocentric Versions of the Capabilities Approach* Chair: Shervin MirzaeiGhazi	Jeroen Smid, *Tib+Tail can lose her tail* Chair: Robin Stenwall	Invited speaker (Aesthetics) **Göran Hermerén,** *Konst. konstvärlden och konstvärden* Chair: Carl-Johan Palmqvist	**Eric Johannesson,** *Quine's underdetermination thesis* Chair: Arvid Båve		Invited speaker (Philosophy of Science) **Richard Dawid** *Final but Incomplete* Chair: Tobias Hansson Wahlberg
11:25-13:00	Lunch						
13:00-13:40	Invited speaker (History of Philosophy) **Pauliina Remes** *Ruling Conversations: Plato's Protagoras on Joint Inquiries* Chair: Fredrik Österblom	Jan Scheffel, *A Dilemma for the Scientific Believer* Chair: Martin Sjöberg		Marco Grossi, *Should theories of validity self-apply?* Chair: Tobias Hansson Wahlberg	Salomon de Leeuw, *Is Parfit Mistaken Regarding the First Mistake in Moral Mathematics?* Chair: Frits Gåvertsson	Invited speaker (Political Philosophy) **Johan Brännmark,** *Structural injustice as distributive* Chair: Olle Blomberg	

Sunday cont.	Room B237	Room B336	Room B251	Room B152	Room C126	Room C121	Room C214
13:50-14:30	**Lauri Kallio,** *Late Idealism and the rise of empiricism in the North* Chair: Fredrik Österblom	**Carl-Johan Palmqvist,** *Local Fictionalism and the Birth of Jesus* Chair: Martin Sjöberg			**Jonathan Knowles,** *Metaphysics for anti-representationalists?* Chair: Robin Stenwall	**Mira Hannegård,** *On Entitlement* Chair: Mattias Gunnemyr	
14:35-15:15	**Jan Forsman,** *Taking Skepticism Seriously: Descartes's Meditations as a cognitive exercise and the Cartesian Epoche* Chair: Fredrik Österblom		**Nils Franzén,** *Openness and mutability* Chair: Robin Stenwall	**Ludovica Conti,** *Arbitrary abstraction and logicality* Chair: Arvid Båve			
15:20-16:00	**Ekrem Cetinkaya,** *Causal Efficacy of Perceptible qualities in Aristotle* Chair: Marianna Leventi		**Henning Strandin,** *Causal interventionism for everyone* Chair: Robin Stenwall		FILOSOFI-DAGARNA ESSAY COMPETITION WINNER		