

Isocrates on *eu phronountes* (*Colloquium Balticum Lundense XI A.D. MMXII*) by Tomas Veteikis (Vilnius University)

*Collectionem materialiarum habeas, Auditrix benigna benigneque Auditor.*

### 1) Examples of the paraphrastic changes in my preliminary analysis.

Isocratean text, ed. by G. Norlin:

The concept *eu phronountes* summarized in my paraphrase:

Προκρίνω δὲ ταύτας [sc. τὰς τῶν πράξεων καὶ τῆς διανοίας εἰκόνας] πρῶτον μὲν εἰδὼς τοὺς καλοὺς κάγαθοὺς τῶν ἀνδρῶν οὐχ οὕτως ἐπὶ τῷ κάλλει τοῦ σώματος σεμνυνομένους ὡς ἐπὶ τοῖς ἔργοις καὶ τῇ γνώμῃ φιλοτιμουμένους· ἔπειθ' ὅτι τοὺς μὲν τύπους ἀναγκαῖον παρὰ τούτοις εἶναι μόνοις παρ' οἷς ἂν σταθῶσιν, τοὺς δὲ λόγους ἐξενεχθῆναι <θ'> οἷόν τ' ἐστὶν εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα καὶ διαδοθέντας ἐν ταῖς τῶν εὖ φρονοῦντων διατριβαῖς ἀγαπᾶσθαι, παρ' οἷς κρεῖττόν ἐστιν ἢ παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν εὐδοκιμεῖν· (*Evagoras* 74)

οἱ εὖ φρονοῦντες ἐν ταῖς ἑαυτῶν διατριβαῖς ἀγαπᾶσι τοὺς λόγους τοὺς περὶ τῶν καλῶν κάγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν· παρὰ τοῖς εὖ φρονοῦσιν μᾶλλον ἢ παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν κρεῖττόν ἐστιν εὐδοκιμεῖν.

Τούτων δ' αἰτίον ἐστὶν ὅτι, προσῆκον ὑμᾶς ὁμοίως ὑπὲρ τῶν κοινῶν ὡσπερ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἰδίων σπουδάζειν, οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν γνώμην ἔχετε περὶ αὐτῶν, ἀλλ' ὅταν μὲν ὑπὲρ τῶν ἰδίων βουλευήσθε, ζητεῖτε συμβούλους τοὺς ἄμεινον φρονοῦντας ὑμῶν αὐτῶν, ὅταν δ' ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως ἐκκλησιάζητε, τοῖς μὲν τοιούτοις ἀπιστεῖτε καὶ φθονεῖτε, τοὺς δὲ πονηροτάτους τῶν ἐπὶ τὸ βῆμα παριόντων ἀσκεῖτε καὶ νομίζετε δημοτικωτέρους εἶναι τοὺς μεθύοντας τῶν νηφόντων καὶ τοὺς νοῦν οὐκ ἔχοντας τῶν εὖ φρονοῦντων καὶ τοὺς τὰ τῆς πόλεως διανεμομένους τῶν ἐκ τῆς ἰδίας οὐσίας ὑμῖν λειτουργούντων. (*De pace* 13)

χρὴ τοὺς εὖ φρονοῦντας ἐν τοῖς τῆς πόλεως ὡσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις ζητεῖν συμβούλους τοὺς ἄμεινον φρονοῦντας σφῶν αὐτῶν καὶ μὴτ' ἀπιστεῖν μήτε φθονεῖν τοῖς τοιούτοις· οἱ εὖ φρονοῦντες δημοτικώτεροί εἰσι τῶν νοῦν οὐκ ἔχόντων ὡσπερ οἱ νήφοντες τῶν μεθύοντων καὶ οἱ ἐκ τῆς ἰδίας οὐσίας λειτουργούντες τῶν τὰ τῆς πόλεως διανεμομένων

2) Examples of the parallel meaning of the concepts εὖ φρονεῖν and ἔχειν νοῦν: Isocr. *De pace* 13 (videte supra). *In sophistas* 4: [...] ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν τι τῶν ἄλλων κτημάτων πολλοστοῦ μέρους τῆς ἀξίας ἐπώλουν, οὐκ ἂν ἠμφισβήτησαν ὡς οὐκ εὖ φρονοῦντες τυγχάνουσιν, σύμπασαν δὲ τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οὕτως ὀλίγου τιμῶντες, ὡς νοῦν ἔχοντες διδάσκαλοι τῶν ἄλλων ἀξιούσιν γίνεσθαι. *Ad Nicoclem* 46: Οἱ πρὸς τοῖς εἰρημένοις φθονοῦσι μὲν τοῖς εὖ φρονοῦσιν, ἀπλοῦς δ' ἠγοῦνται τοὺς νοῦν οὐκ ἔχοντας [...] Posidippus fr. 33 (Kock)<sup>1</sup>: οὐκ ἔργον ἐστὶν εὖ λέγειν, ἀλλ' εὖ φρονεῖν / πολλοὶ γὰρ εὖ λέγοντες οὐκ ἔχουσι νοῦν.

A list of locations of the concepts occurring in *corpus Isocrateum* (including letters):

εὖ φρονεῖν (εὖ φρονοῦντες): *In soph.* 4; 14; *Hel.* 10; 22; 42; 45; *Bus.* 15; *Paneg.* 2; 9; 48; 107; *Plat.* 23; *Ad Nic.* 28; 46; 50; *Nic.* 16; *Evag.* 74; *Archid.* 19; 34; *De pace* 13; 35; 141; *Areop.* 31; 54; *Antid.* 165; 280; *Phil.* 31; 56; 82; 89; *Panath.* 32; 112; 136; 151; 204; 214; 230; *Epist.* 3 (*Ad Philippum II*), 2; *Epist.* 5 (*Ad Alexandrum*), 2; *Epist.* 7 (*Ad Timotheum*), 2; 4. νοῦν ἔχειν (νοῦν ἔχοντες): *Ad Nic.* 53; *Nic.* 9; *Evag.* 7; *De pace* 8; *Antid.* 23; 80; 137; *Phil.* 76; *Panath.* 34; 118; 178; *Epist.* 5 (*Ad Alexandrum*), 2.

3) Homeric formula, attested 14 times: ὁ σφιν ἐὺ φρονέων ἀγορήσατο καὶ μετέειπεν (*Il.* 1, 73; 1, 253; 2, 78; 2, 288; 7, 326; 7, 367; 9, 95; 15, 285; 18, 253; *Od.* 2, 160; 2, 228; 7, 158; 16, 399; 24, 53). Characterization of Arētē in *Od.* 7, 73-74: οὐ μὲν γὰρ τι νόου γε καὶ αὐτὴ δεῦται ἐσθλοῦ, / οἷσί τ'<sup>2</sup> ἐὺ φρονέησι, καὶ ἀνδράσι νεῖκα λύει.

<sup>1</sup> *Comicorum Atticorum fragmenta*, vol. 3, ed. T. Kock, Leipzig: Teubner, 1888.

<sup>2</sup> Basing on some patterns with οἷσί + particle κε +coniunctivus (subjunctive) I would prefer reading οἷσί κ' ἐὺ φρονέησι here.

4) *Eu phronountes* in a syntactic context (examples of formulaic expressions with *χρή* and *προσῆκει*):

Excerpt from Isocratean speech (ed. G. Norlin)	Short identification of current grammatical form
<i>Bus.</i> 15: Ἦρξάτο [...] ἐνταῦθεν, ὅθεν περ <i>χρή τοὺς εὖ φρονοῦντας</i> [...]	Acc. ( <i>χρή</i> + ACI <sup>3</sup> )
<i>Archid.</i> 34: Λέγουσιν δ' οἱ συμβουλευόντες [...] ὡς <i>χρή τοὺς εὖ φρονοῦντας</i> μὴ τὴν αὐτὴν γνώμην ἔχειν [...]	Acc. ( <i>χρή</i> + ACI)
<i>De pace</i> 8: <i>Χρή δὲ τοὺς νοῦν ἔχοντας</i> περὶ μὲν ὧν ἴσασιν, μὴ βουλευέσθαι [...]	Acc. ( <i>χρή</i> + ACI)
<i>De pace</i> 35: <i>Χρή δὲ τοὺς εὖ φρονοῦντας</i> [...] τοῦτο φαίνεσθαι προαιρουμένους.	Acc. ( <i>χρή</i> + ACI)
<i>Areop.</i> 31: [...] περὶ τὸν ἴδιον βίον τοσαύτην ἐποιοῦντο πρόνοιαν ἀλλήλων ὅσην περ <i>χρή τοὺς εὖ φρονοῦντας</i> καὶ πατρίδος κοινωνοῦντας	Acc. ( <i>χρή</i> + ACI)
<i>Antid.</i> 23: Καίτοι <i>χρή τοὺς νοῦν ἔχοντας</i> τοιοῦτους εἶναι κριτὰς τοῖς ἄλλοις [...]	Acc. ( <i>χρή</i> + ACI)
<i>Antid.</i> 80: <i>Χρή δὲ τοὺς νοῦν ἔχοντας</i> περὶ ἀμφοτέρα μὲν ταῦτα σπουδάζειν [...]	Acc. ( <i>χρή</i> + ACI)
<i>Panath.</i> 151: [...] καὶ προστάταις καὶ συμβούλοις ἐχρῶντο τοιοῦτοις οἷσις <i>χρή τοὺς εὖ φρονοῦντας</i> .	Acc. ( <i>χρή</i> + ACI)
<i>Panath.</i> 230: Ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀπὴι φρονιμώτερος γεγενημένος καὶ συνεσταλμένην ἔχων τὴν διάνοιαν, ὥσπερ <i>χρή τοὺς εὖ φρονοῦντας</i> [...]	Acc. ( <i>χρή</i> + ACI)
<i>Epist.</i> 5 ( <i>Ad Alexandrum</i> ), 2: Τῶν τε γὰρ πολιτῶν ἀποδέχεσθαι σε τῶν ἡμετέρων οὐ τοὺς ἡμεληκότας αὐτῶν [...], ἀλλ' οἷς συνδιατρίβων [...] οὐκ ἂν λυπηθείς [...], οἷσις περ <i>χρή πλησιάζειν τοὺς εὖ φρονοῦντας</i> [...]	Acc. ( <i>χρή</i> + ACI)
<i>Paneg.</i> 107: Ὑπὲρ ὧν προσῆκει <i>τοὺς εὖ φρονοῦντας</i> μεγάλην χάριν ἔχειν [...]	Acc. ( <i>προσῆκει</i> + ACI)
<i>Plat.</i> 23: [...] διότι προσῆκει <i>τοὺς εὖ φρονοῦντας</i> ἐν [...] τῷ πολέμῳ σκοπεῖν [...]	Acc. ( <i>προσῆκει</i> + ACI)
<i>Antid.</i> 165: Καίτοι προσῆκε <i>τοὺς εὖ φρονοῦντας</i> εὐχεσθαι τοῖς θεοῖς ὡς πλείστοις τῶν πολιτῶν παραγενέσθαι τὴν δύναμιν αὐτὴν [...]	Acc. ( <i>προσῆκει</i> + ACI)
<i>Panath.</i> 112: Ἦν δὴ τοιοῦτον ἐπιχειρῶσιν τι ποιεῖν, προσῆκει <i>τοὺς εὖ φρονοῦντας</i> ληρεῖν νομίζειν αὐτούς.	Acc. ( <i>προσῆκει</i> + ACI)
<i>Epist.</i> 7 ( <i>Ad Timotheum</i> ), 4: [...] κακῶς εἰδότες ὅτι προσῆκει <i>τοὺς εὖ φρονοῦντας</i> καὶ τὴν τιμὴν αὐτὴν ἔχοντας μὴ τοῖς τῶν ἄλλων κακοῖς αὐτοῖς ἡδονὰς παρασκευάζειν, ἀλλὰ [...] τοὺς πολίτας εὐδαιμονεστέρουσ ποιεῖν [...]	Acc. ( <i>προσῆκει</i> + ACI)

5) *Eu phronountes* in a syntactic context (examples of constructions with a) *adiectivum verbale necessitatis*, b) potential optative, c) *adiectivum verbale probabilitatis*, d) *genitivus possessivus*):

a) [...] σπουδαστέον ἐστὶν *τοῖς εὖ φρονοῦσιν* [...] (*Antid.* 280); οὐ μὴν δουλευτέον *τοὺς νοῦν ἔχοντας* τοῖς οὕτω κακῶς φρονοῦσιν [...] (*Evag.* 9);

b) Τίς γὰρ ἂν τῶν *εὖ φρονοῦντων* συμφορὰς ἐπαινεῖν ἐπιχειρήσειεν; (*Hel.* 10); Καίτοι τίς οὐκ ἂν δέξαιτο τῶν *εὖ φρονοῦντων* τοιαύτης πολιτείας μετέχειν [...] (*Nic.* 16); Ἦπερ ἅπαντες μὲν ἂν *οἱ νοῦν ἔχοντες* ἔλοιτο καὶ βουληθεῖεν [...] (*Panath.* 118); cf. *In soph.* 14);

c) [...] *τοῖς εὖ φρονοῦσιν* πολλῶν αἰρετώτερόν ἐστιν [...] (*Hel.* 42);

d) *Paneg.* 9: “[...] τῶν *εὖ φρονοῦντων* ἴδιόν ἐστιν” or in *Panath.* 34: “Ἔστι δ' *ἄνδρὸς νοῦν ἔχοντος* [...]”

6) Isocrates inserts himself among *eu phronountes* (*Panath.* 136): **Ἐμοὶ δὲ τῶν μὲν τοιοῦτων ἀκροατῶν οὐδὲν πώποτ' ἐμέλησεν, οὐδὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῖς εὖ φρονοῦσιν**, ἐκείνων δὲ τῶν ἅ τε προεῖπον πρὸ ἅπαντος τοῦ λόγου μνημονευσόντων, τῷ τε πληθεῖ τῶν λεγομένων οὐκ ἐπιτιμησόντων, οὐδ' ἦν μυρίων ἐπῶν ἢ τὸ μῆκος, ἀλλ' ἐφ' αὐτοῖς εἶναι νομιούτων τοσοῦτον ἀναγνῶναι μέρος καὶ διελθεῖν ὅποσον ἂν αὐτοὶ βουληθῶσιν, πάντων δὲ μάλιστα τῶν οὐδενὸς ἂν ἴδιον ἀκούοντων ἢ λόγου

<sup>3</sup> ACI = *accusativus cum infinitivo*

διεξιόντος ἀνδρῶν ἀρετὰς καὶ πόλεως τρόπον καλῶς οἰκουμένης, [137] ἄπερ εἰ μιμήσασθαι τινες βουληθεῖεν καὶ δυναθεῖεν, αὐτοὶ τ' ἂν ἐν μεγάλῃ δόξῃ τὸν βίον διαγάγοιεν καὶ τὰς πόλεις τὰς αὐτῶν εὐδαίμονας ποιήσαιεν.

## 7) Isocratean definitions that bear certain similarities to the concept of *eu phronountes*.

Definition of (*kalōs*) *pepaideumenoi* [= *phronimoi*, *tele(i)oi andres*]:

[30] Τίνας οὖν καλῶ πεπαιδευμένους, ἐπειδὴ τὰς τέχνας καὶ τὰς ἐπιστήμας καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις ἀποδοκιμάζω; Πρῶτον μὲν **τοὺς καλῶς χρωμένους τοῖς πράγμασι** τοῖς κατὰ τὴν ἡμέραν ἐκάστην προσπίπτουσι, **καὶ τὴν δόξαν ἐπιτυχῆ τῶν καιρῶν ἔχοντας** καὶ δυναμένην ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ **στοχάζεσθαι τοῦ συμφέροντος**. [31] ἔπειτα **τοὺς πρεπόντως καὶ δικαίως ὁμιλοῦντας τοῖς ἀεὶ πλησιάζουσι**, καὶ τὰς μὲν τῶν ἄλλων ἀηδίας καὶ βαρύτητας εὐκόλως καὶ ῥαδίως φέροντας, **σφᾶς δ' αὐτοὺς ὡς δυνατὸν ἐλαφροτάτους καὶ μετριοτάτους τοῖς συνοῦσι παρέχοντας**. ἔτι **τοὺς τῶν μὲν ἡδονῶν ἀεὶ κρατοῦντας, τῶν δὲ συμφορῶν μὴ λίαν ἠττωμένους**, ἀλλ' ἀνδρωδῶς ἐν αὐταῖς διακειμένους καὶ τῆς φύσεως ἀξίως ἧς μετέχοντες τυγχάνομεν. [32] τέταρτον, ὅπερ μέγιστον, **τοὺς μὴ διαφθειρομένους ὑπὸ τῶν εὐπραγιῶν μηδ' ἐξισταμένους αὐτῶν μηδ' ὑπερηφάνους γιγνομένους**, ἀλλ' ἐμμένοντας τῇ τάξει τῇ **τῶν εὖ φρονοῦντων** καὶ **μὴ μᾶλλον χαίροντας τοῖς διὰ τύχην ὑπάρξασιν ἀγαθοῖς ἢ τοῖς διὰ τὴν αὐτῶν φύσιν καὶ φρόνησιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς γιγνομένοις**. Τοὺς δὲ μὴ μόνον πρὸς ἐν τούτων, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς ἅπαντα ταῦτα τὴν ἕξιν τῆς ψυχῆς εὐάρμοστον ἔχοντας, τοῦτους φημὶ καὶ φρονίμους εἶναι καὶ τελέους ἀνδρας καὶ πάσας ἔχειν τὰς ἀρετὰς.

Definition of *sophoi*:

*Ad Nicoclem* 39 [= *Antidosis* 73]: Σοφοὺς νόμιζε μὴ τοὺς ἀκριβῶς περὶ μικρῶν ἐρίζοντας, ἀλλὰ **τοὺς εὖ περὶ τῶν μεγίστων λέγοντας**. μηδὲ τοὺς τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις εὐδαιμονίαν ὑπισχνουμένους, αὐτοὺς δ' ἐν πολλαῖς ἀπορίαις ὄντας, ἀλλὰ **τοὺς μέτρια μὲν περὶ αὐτῶν λέγοντας, ὁμιλεῖν δὲ καὶ τοῖς πράγμασιν καὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις δυναμένους**, καὶ μὴ διαταραττομένους ἐν ταῖς τοῦ βίου μεταβολαῖς, ἀλλὰ **καλῶς καὶ μετρίως καὶ τὰς συμφορὰς καὶ τὰς εὐτυχίας φέρειν ἐπισταμένους**.

Distinction between *sophoi* and *philosophoi*:

*Antidosis* 270-271: [270] Περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων ἀπόχρη μοι τὸ νῦν εἶναι ταῦτ' εἰρηκέναι καὶ συμβεβουλευκέναι· περὶ δὲ σοφίας καὶ φιλοσοφίας, τοῖς μὲν περὶ ἄλλων τινῶν ἀγωνιζομένοις οὐκ ἂν ἀρμόσειε λέγειν περὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων τούτων, – ἔστιν γὰρ ἀλλότρια πάσαις ταῖς πραγματεῖαις, – ἐμοὶ δ' ἐπειδὴ καὶ κρίνομαι περὶ τῶν τοιούτων καὶ τὴν καλουμένην ὑπὸ τινῶν φιλοσοφίαν οὐκ εἶναι φημι, προσήκει τὴν δικαίως ἂν νομιζομένην ὀρίσαι καὶ δηλῶσαι πρὸς ὑμᾶς. [271] Ἀπλῶς δὲ πως τυγχάνω γινώσκων περὶ αὐτῶν. Ἐπειδὴ γὰρ οὐκ ἔνεστιν ἐν τῇ φύσει τῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐπιστήμην λαβεῖν, ἣν ἔχοντες ἂν εἰδεῖμεν ὅ τι πρακτέον ἢ λεκτέον ἐστίν, ἐκ τῶν λοιπῶν **σοφοὺς μὲν νομίζω τοὺς ταῖς δόξαις ἐπιτυγχάνειν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τοῦ βελτίστου δυναμένους, φιλοσόφους δὲ τοὺς ἐν τούτοις διατρίβοντας, ἐξ ὧν τάχιστα λήψονται τὴν τοιαύτην φρόνησιν**.

## Addenda lectu haud indigna

### Prosopographical characteristics of *eu phronountes*

#### 1. Direct and indirect features<sup>4</sup>

**1.1. Wise eloquence (the ability to use the power of *logos*).** *Eu phronountes* are people whose soul is *eu phronousa*, able to produce beautiful and artful speech (*Paneg.* 48-49). Relevant speaking (τὸ γὰρ λέγειν ὡς δεῖ) is the most important feature of good/right thinking (τοῦ φρονεῖν εὖ μέγιστον σημεῖον) and it indicates the good person with good soul (καὶ λόγος ἀληθῆς καὶ νόμιμος καὶ δίκαιος ψυχῆς ἀγαθῆς καὶ πιστῆς εἰδωλόν ἐστιν - *Nic.* 7). Sound thinking (*eu phronein*) and the ability to create meaningful speech is another type of capacity different from that of having a strong voice and courage to speak in the crowd, the qualities indispensable for politics; however, intelligence at least enables

<sup>4</sup> Features of *eu phronountes* are comparable to and have much common with the character of well educated men described by Isocrates in *Panathenaicus* 30-32 and with the concept of wise men defined in his speech *Ad Nicoclem* 39 (later repeated in *Antidosis* 73): it is not the skill in counting, contemplating abstract concepts and winning contentions that proclaim wisdom, but moral values that are reflected in one's behaviour and speech.

to claim for the competence in giving advices (*Phil.* 81-82). The main means of expression pertaining to intelligent people is a reasonable speech (*logos*), which is the prerequisite (or even a “ruler”, *hēgemōn*) of all reasonable actions (*Nic.* 9). Each intelligent man must use his power with caution, because of the ambivalence of the words: they can both help and hurt (*Phil.* 75-76). It is the intelligent man (*anēr eu phronōn*) who manages to use his knowledge, perception and vocabulary appropriately and in a timely manner (*Paneg.* 9). To such a person the insightful sense of appropriate rhetorical situation (*eukairia*) is more important than abundance of words and other means of expression (*euporia*) (*Panath.* 33-34). **1.2. Seriousness (*semnotēs*)**. When speaking to the crowd, an intelligent man ignores frivolous listeners (*Panath.* 135-136). Seriousness of orator’s stance and solemnity of the subject matter is a commonplace found especially in Isocratean discourses related to his polemics against sophists and other critics (eg. *Against sophists*, *Busiris*, *Helen*, *Antidosis*). **1.3. Friendliness, openness, mildness (*praotēs*)**. Intelligent people are good friends: it is suitable to talk to them openly (*parrhēsiā*) in order to have an adviser by one’s side, who will help to find way out of a confusing situation (*Ad Nic.* 28). Intelligent people are more committed to the public (*dēmotikoteroi*) than unwise ones; they differ from fools like the sober ones differ from the drunken ones and like those who spend their own money from those who waste common property (*De Pace* 13). **1.4. Public value and position in society (*eudoxia*)**. In respect of their capacity to teach others, intelligent people are useful to their citizens; their usefulness is a criterion on which their own evaluation should be based (*Nic.* 50-53). They are more useful than athletes, from whom nobody would benefit, even if the latter obtain twice as big force (*Paneg.* 1-2). The best way to become famous is to be recognized among the intelligent people, therefore, the focus should not solely be on body and its commemoration in sculpture but more on good deeds and substantial opinion which would become widespread among intelligent people (*Evag.* 74-75). According to popular view, the children of base families who surpassed in virtue their parents are more intelligent than children of righteous parents (*Ep. 7 Ad Timotheum* 1-2). Intelligent people are envied by those who are involved in pleasures contrary to benefit (*Ad Nic.* 45-46).

## 2. Ethical rules of intelligent people.

Isocrates as one of the classical Greek theorists of deliberation<sup>5</sup> produces a number of instructions concerning the three areas of reasoning activities: 1) deliberation and commitment to it (*orthē diathesis pros to bouleuesthai*), 2) evaluation of others and control of critique (*orthē krisis*), 3) right choice, opinion, and determination to act (*orthē gnōmē*). In the field of deliberation, intelligent people are required to observe the distinction between deliberation and action: not to take into consideration what is already known, but to act according to that knowledge; and in dealing with the issues that are under consideration, they should not think that they know the future, but be disposed towards the disputable matter as appropriate for those, who have only opinion (not real knowledge) and are ready for whatever happens (*De pace* 8). The character of intelligent man, as developed in the speeches of Isocrates, in his deliberations on the historical events is trying to look consenting to the authoritative opinion of the intelligent people of the past, but when dealing with his own time, he strives to rely on the contemporary opinions (*Hel.* 22). In the field of evaluation, the *eu phronountes* as depicted by Isocrates support and praise only serious and beneficial things, rather than disasters and trifles (cf. *Hel.* 10). Such a task is primarily assigned to sophists: they should avoid insignificant and unpopular topics, and should instead display their art in areas where intense competition prevails (*Hel.* 9). *Eu phronountes* would support the view that pursuing “philosophy” (ethico-rhetorical education) does not ensure great achievements in political career: it is the gifted practitioners of this art that gain more advantages in this field (*In soph.* 14). In defending the seriousness of the subject of the myth, Isocrates defends reputation of Helen and Paris and argues that *eu phronountes* would have supported the (alleged) determination of Paris to accept the gift offered by Aphrodite after he has (allegedly) placed his family in the perspective of a long-term glory (*Hel.* 44-45). When evaluating public’s favourite individuals, intelligent people try not to despise them, but seek to earn a good reputation for themselves, while benefiting them and receiving their publicly spoken appreciation (*Antid.* 137). Isocrates emphasizes **the adequacy and correctness of evaluation**. The requirement of correct evaluation applies to people of different professions: judges, politicians, teachers, merchants. Wise judges must follow the “golden” rule: to **judge** others the

<sup>5</sup> This statement is based on the article „The Topics of Counsel and Deliberation in Prephilosophic Greek Literature“ by Edward Boucher Stevens in *Classical Philology*, Vol. 28, No. 2 (April), 1933, 104-120. See esp. p. 118: „Besides his elaboration of commonplaces, Isocrates has much to say on deliberation of a near-philosophic content“, and further.

way they themselves would like to be judged by others, i.e. to take account of the possibility of false accusation (slander) because of the activity of over-zealous talebearers, sycophants (*Antid.* 23). When teaching others, wise teachers must **adequately assess** the subject they teach, not to underestimate it (*In soph.* 4). This is based on an analogy to the more general example from the trading business: smart people do not sell items for a portion of its price (*ibid.*). Through the lips of the Spartan king the idea is conveyed that intelligent people being in a different state (favorable or unfavorable) must **assess** the situation in different way and always take non-radical decisions, depending on the current situation (*Archid.* 34)<sup>6</sup>. In the field of decision (choice and advice), one can notice several topics which in the speeches of Isocrates are often expressed in the form of advices similar to gnomes or maxims<sup>7</sup>. Quite a number of such Isocratean gnomes deal with the choices and decisions of intelligent people. These maxims, according to my tentative classification, comprise the following 6 topics or rules: 1) it is wise to seek pleasure and benefit, but one should observe the gentleness of measures (cf. *Hel.* 41-42; *Epist.* 7, 4-5); 2) it is wise to take care of one's own needs, profit, perfection, reputation (cf. *Ad Nic.* 46; *Antid.* 279-280; *De pace* 34-35); 3) it is wise to lean on the better than oneself and not follow a bad example (cf. *De pace* 13; *Ad Alexandrum* 2-3; *Archid.* 18-19); 4) it is wise to be moderate (*Panath.* 32; cf. 279-280); 5) it is wise to support compatriots both in public and private affairs (*Areop.* 31); 6) it is wise to strive to change maladies, despite strong opposition and negative reaction (*Evag.* 7).

### 3. Political orientation of intelligent people

The *eu phronountes*, appearing in the speeches of Isocrates as positive characters, can be associated with the author's own political views. Thus one can notice the Panhellenic mentality of these characters, with clear focus on Athenocentric politics and criticism of Athenian democracy characteristic to Isocrates. Intelligent man of Isocrates time would look with sadness at the evils (such as frequent law-suits, accusations by sycophants, tax-levies, poverty, wars) of contemporary Athens (*Areop.* 53-54). He, however, would not blame the democracy; on the contrary, he would thank Athens for installing the same order in the allied city-states as well (*Paneg.* 106-107). He would welcome the ancestral order of Athens, her correct policy and reasonable choice of leaders and advisors (*Panath.* 151); he would approve of the attitude of Athenian ancestors to take into account the interests of all Hellenes, gain their favour and follow them as critics (*Panath.* 188). Intelligent people would justify the mistakes of Athenian policy, and would assent to the attitude of Athenian politicians that it is better to rule other city-states without justice (*mē dikaiōs archein*) than to suffer unjust rule of Sparta (*Panath.* 117-118). Intelligent man would disagree with unsubstantiated claims about the differences between the Spartan and Athenian polities and their moral character<sup>8</sup> (*Panath.* 109-112), moreover, he would not share the view that the Spartans are inventors of "the best ways of life"<sup>9</sup> (*Panath.* 202-204)<sup>10</sup>. Topic of the Panhellenic concord. Intelligent people would support the idea of abstaining from the attack against greater enemy (Persia) before the internal reconciliation among the Greeks (*Phil.* 88-89). The initiative of reconciliation pertains to the strongest *poleis* because the others would then follow their example (*Phil.* 30-31). It is the city-state of Athens that has a quick recovery of sound thinking (*eu phronein*) and willingness to put up with the Greeks (*De Pace* 141; *Phil.* 30-31).

*Praesens imperfectum, perfectum futurum...*

<sup>6</sup> In the face of success, they should not flaunt their power nor seek to implement justice at all costs; on the contrary, they should look for what is the best and most expedient at the moment (*sumpheron*).

<sup>7</sup> Aristotle has noticed Isocrates' predilection to involve the elements of deliberative (or advise) literature in epideictic speeches, e.g. to alternate praise (*epainos*) with counsel (*hypothēkē*) (*Arst. Rhet.* I, 9, 1368 a. 5-7)

<sup>8</sup> E.g. concerning the claim for the moderation (*sōphrosune*) and compliance (*peitharchia*) as specifically Spartan features and attribution of misconduct (*oligōria*) primarily to Athenians

<sup>9</sup> As translated by G. Norlin.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. also *Paneg.* 45-48, where Athens is praised as educational and cultural center of Hellas.